

# Afghanistan Research Newsletter

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**Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit**  
*Research for a Better Afghanistan*

## Wheat Research: A Crucial Prerequisite to Food Security in Afghanistan

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
Wheat is the staple food in Afghanistan, accounting for approximately 60 percent of the calorie intake of the population. It also has the distinction of being Afghanistan’s major crop, accounting for roughly 70 percent of the cultivated land area (Chabot and Dorosh, 2007), however, the country’s domestic production of wheat has never been sufficient for meeting demand, and is also prone to great weather-induced fluctuations (Fig 1). Wheat imports from neighbouring countries have been required to meet local demand. Approximately 45 percent of Afghanistan’s wheat acreage in a normal year is irrigated, accounting for about 70 percent of production. The remaining 55 percent of wheat acreage relies on timely rainfall and typically provides the remaining 30 percent of home production. Winter snowfall in the mountain ranges of central Afghanistan supplies over 80 percent of the country’s annual precipitation, with snowmelt in the spring the major source of irrigation water, running through rivers and streams that originate in the mountains.

fao.org). Moreover, as of today only about a quarter of Afghan agricultural land is irrigated, and much of that inefficiently.

### Early Wheat Research in Afghanistan:

Concerted efforts to establish agricultural research were made only towards the end of the fifties when a USAID-assisted Applied and Adaptive Unit was established in 1959 at Darulaman research station in the Department of Extension (MAIL, 2007). Basic legislation establishing agricultural research in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation was promulgated in April 1963. In order to bring about closer coordination and implementation of agricultural programmes, the March 1966 reorganisation brought both research and extension under the administrative control of one President for “Agricultural Research & Extension” (Anonymous, 1967). Later in 1965-66 the ministry decided that the major effort of the research organisation should be devoted to the wheat programme. Work on Mexican wheat resulted in the identification of adapted genotypes like Lerma Rojo 64A, Kenya Mentana, Vilufen and Mexi-Pak.

Figure 1: Wheat production and productivity in Afghanistan from 1968 to 2009



Source: FAOSTAT, 2010: <http://faostat.fao.org/>

In 2009, the most bountiful rainfall in 32 years brought harvests that made Afghanistan nearly self-sufficient in cereals. The message was clear—there is much agricultural potential in Afghanistan which irrigation could realise. However, the year also told us that even the best of the years did not help us produce enough to be self sufficient. Moreover, the disproportionately large acreages devoted to wheat also make Afghanistan import many other agri-products which can be produced here, provided higher wheat productivity spares some land for growing other crops. The import of agricultural produce by Afghanistan stood at a whopping US\$ 830 million during 2007 (FAOSTAT, 2010: <http://faostat.fao.org/>).

### Establishment of Research Programs and Institutions:

Agricultural research received a boost when the research unit was upgraded to the level of a General Directorate of Research and Soil Sciences in 1970. The state of agriculture and agricultural research were reviewed by USAID through several committees (Anonymous, 1967; Anonymous, 1972 and Olson, 1988). The current Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) was known as the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI) during the early seventies. In 1982, this directorate was upgraded to the level of a national-level research institute,

the Agricultural Research Institute of Afghanistan (ARIA), the name by which it is currently known. The agricultural situation, however, had deteriorated to a great extent and wheat production as such had declined over the decade (Olson, 1988). The two wheat varieties viz., Pak81 (also known as Veery 6) and Pirsaback 85 were found suitable (Hepworth, 1988) for spring wheat areas which account for about 80 percent of wheat cultivation by area, whereas the varieties Bestoya, Kavkaz, Bolal and Roussulka were found suitable for winter wheat cultivation. The SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) supported an enhanced crop productivity project. Starting in 1996, this tested 3,881 wheat genotypes in 15 provinces, leading to the development of Herat-99, Mazar-99 and Amu-99 for irrigated production. For rainfed conditions, Dayma 96 and Ghorri 96 were found suitable (Wassimi, 1999). The project also reported improved fertiliser rates and sowing dates for wheat cultivation.

At the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992, the government-supported crop improvement programme collapsed. It was restarted in 1996 under the management of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), releasing 15 wheat varieties: 10 for irrigated areas and 5 for rainfed areas. Dennis *et al.* (2002) noted that most introduced varieties were for irrigated areas, while families in rainfed areas constituted some 44 percent of the total farming households.

#### Outcome of Wheat Research:

Wheat research in the country has so far emphasised only the release of new varieties. This has not involved

any home-grown breeding programme but rather the evaluation of introduced genotypes bred elsewhere. The lists of wheat varieties introduced up to 2001 and beyond are presented in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. ARIA at present has 17 research stations in addition to the head office at Kabul. New genotypes are being continuously introduced by several organisations like the International Centre for Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA) and CIMMYT which are then evaluated in multi-location trials at several locations across Afghanistan to identify the best-yielding and most disease resistant ones for release as varieties. Table 2 lists the varieties released during this decade.

**Table 1: Wheat Varieties Introduced into Afghanistan from Abroad, 1989-2001**

Crop	Varieties
Wheat	Pak-81, Pirsabak-85, Khyber-87, Pirsabak-91, Ataya-85, Zarghoon-79, Blue Silver, Sonalika, Faisalabad-85, Zardana, Zamindar, Rhotas-91, Pasban-91, Bezostaya, Sonali, Kartaya, Shaghesti, Inqilab-91, HD-2285, HD-2329, HD-2232, Bakhtawar-92, MH-97, PBW-154, HUW-234, WH-542

#### Impact of Wheat Research:

The overall impact of research is reflected in productivity, as measured by total production and production per unit area (t/ha). Wheat productivity increased from 1.15 t/ha in 1968 to 1.97 t/ha in 2009, an increase of over 72 percent during this period (Fig 1). Total wheat

The *Afghanistan Research Newsletter* is a quarterly publication of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). The purpose of the Newsletter is to alert readers to new research being undertaken on Afghanistan and to help disseminate research findings and analysis. Some of the resources cited are available on the internet; most books and other publications are available at the AREU library, located in the AREU office (corner of Flower Street and Street 2) and open to researchers Sunday to Thursday, 9am-12pm and 12.30pm-4pm. The Newsletter is compiled by Royce Wiles. If you have ideas for books or other publications or resources that should be included in the Newsletter, please send an email to [newsletter@areu.org.af](mailto:newsletter@areu.org.af).

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research institute based in Kabul. AREU's mission is to inform and influence policy and practice through conducting high-quality, policy-relevant research and actively disseminating the results, and to promote a culture of research and learning. AREU was established in 2002 by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a board of directors with representation from donors, the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, and non-governmental organisations. AREU currently receives core funds from the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Specific projects have been funded by the Foundation of the Open Society Institute Afghanistan (FOSIA), the Asia Foundation (TAF), the European Commission (EC) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). All AREU publications are available at [www.areu.org.af](http://www.areu.org.af).

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**Table 2: Wheat Varieties Released in Afghanistan during the Current Decade**

<i>Variety</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Seed Source</i>	<i>Type</i>
Solh-02	2002	TCI	Winter Wheat
Parva 2	2002	CIMMYT	Durum Wheat
Ariana-07	2007	CIMMYT	Spring Wheat
Darulaman-07	2007	CIMMYT	Spring Wheat
Drukshan-08	2008	CIMMYT	Spring Wheat
Shishambagh-08	2008	CIMMYT	Spring Wheat
Autan	2009	FEAC	Winter Wheat
MHO304	2009	FEAC	Winter Wheat
Exotic	2009	FEAC	Winter Wheat
Soissons	2009	FEAC	Winter Wheat
Andalou	2009	FEAC	Winter Wheat
Guadaloupe	2009	FEAC	Winter Wheat
Muqawim -09	2009	CIMMYT	Ug 99 Resistant Spring Wheat
Koshan -09	2009	CIMMYT	Ug 99 Resistant Spring Wheat
Baghlan -09	2009	CIMMYT	Ug 99 Resistant Spring Wheat

*Abbreviations: TCI: Turkey-CIMMYT-ICARDA initiative; CIMMYT: International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre; FEAC: French Embassy Agriculture Cooperation*

production during the same period increased from 2.35 million metric tonnes to 5.06 million metric tonnes with a growth of 116 percent.

The lack of consistency in the trend in the figure referred to above shows the vulnerability of Afghanistan's agriculture to weather. The production and productivity were comparable in 1968 and 1978 but largely stagnated until beginning to fall in 2007, followed by a major depression in 2008. 2009 proved to be the best so far, achieving the highest recorded levels of wheat production and productivity. If the depression and stagnation spanning from 1978 till 2007 could be attributed to political upheaval, that in 2008 was due to unfavourable weather. The 2008 depression also highlights the importance of research to help insulate Afghan agriculture from the vagaries of weather. Since this figure does not illustrate year to year variation, the one given below (Fig 2) displays five year averages at both the ends of the thirty year period from 1978-79 to 2007-08.

#### **Comparison with Neighbouring Countries:**


The five year averages bring out the comparison among the neighbouring countries, demonstrating that Afghanistan lost ground in wheat production and productivity during the last thirty years (and presumably research pace as well) though its neighbours maintained those. Afghanistan's wheat productivity averaged over 1975-79 was comparable to its

neighbours, even beating that of Iran. However, wheat productivity gains (150 percent and 79 percent) leading to production gains (157 percent and 125 percent) have been phenomenal during the thirty year period for both Iran and Pakistan respectively, whereas Afghanistan's average wheat productivity increased only by 25 percent and average production by 54 percent during the same period. In spite of the record production of wheat during 2009, the country still had a deficit of 191,000 tonnes of wheat out of a total cereals deficit of 220,000 tonnes (Anonymous, 2009).

#### **Research to Secure Stable Wheat Production in Afghanistan:**

The first and foremost priority is to develop and release suitable varieties for rainfed and other suboptimal areas. However, this forms only part of the picture. The performance of a variety at a given location is the result of its interaction with the specific environment there. The basic premise of releasing cultivars for commercial cultivation is that the target region has agroclimatic conditions similar to the one in which the released variety was tested. This warrants a careful classification of all wheat-growing regions of Afghanistan into the appropriate agro-climatic zones. These would subsequently form the basis for the release of suitable wheat varieties for each zone based. Since we have two important wheat seasons (spring and autumn), the number and size of zones may vary for each.

**Figure 2: Changes in wheat production (Pd) in million metric tonnes and productivity (Pdy) in quintals per hectare over a thirty year span averaged over the starting and ending five year periods for the three neighbouring countries of Iran, Pakistan (Pak) and Afghanistan (Af)**



Other important issues that need attention of researchers and policy makers are:

1. Delineation of wheat-growing regions of the country into agroclimatic zones for both sowing seasons by province or district.
2. Crop husbandry optimisation for each zone.
3. A disease and insect pest survey and surveillance system to enable a proactive response to emerging pathogens or pests.
4. Socioeconomic measures such as credit to farmers combined with insurance schemes to ensure loan repayment in case of crop failure.
5. Guaranteed purchase of the produce from the farmers at an economically viable price.

#### Conclusion:

The good rains of 2009 enabled Afghanistan to achieve the best wheat harvest in recorded history. However, the general impression that irrigation alone can solve all issues of food security overlooks a number of other solutions available. There are several huge gaps in wheat research and development in the country which, if plugged, could not only make Afghanistan self-sufficient in wheat production but also release large areas for other crops to improve overall food security for the country as a whole.

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*Please note: this article is a lightly edited version of the original.*

## New Publications from AREU

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**November 2010, “Means to What End? Policymaking and State-Building in Afghanistan,”** by Sarah Parkinson. Afghanistan has been in “state-building” mode since 2001, and formal policymaking has been an important tool for focusing and coordinating the efforts of the Afghan government and its international supporters. This synthesis paper considers the role that high-level policymaking has actually played, through a comparative analysis of five different recent examples of policymaking including the drafting of the Afghan National Development Strategy and the controversial Shiite personal status law. It highlights both the high level of donor influence on shaping policy, and the limited effectiveness of policies themselves.

**November 2010, “Poverty in Afghan Policy: Enhancing Solutions through Better Defining the Problem,”** by Paula Kantor and Adam Pain. Over the past few years, Afghan policymakers have put aside strategies encouraging pro-poor growth in favour of solutions that focus on expanding GDP. In addition, existing solutions to poverty are becoming increasingly technically-oriented and fail to take local social realities and power structures into account. This briefing paper calls for policymakers and programmers to refocus on poverty and its social causes as a way to ensure that efforts to improve the lives of rural Afghans meet with lasting success.

**November 2010, “Governance Structures in Nimroz Province,”** by Anna Larson. This case study examined popular perspectives on democracy and governance structures in Nimroz Province—an area far removed from the political centre in Kabul and strongly influenced by its proximity to neighbouring Iran. Its remoteness has left it vulnerable to natural disasters but largely shielded from the political instability plaguing the rest of the country. The study found that each of these factors has helped shape a unique set of local attitudes towards democratic and traditional institutions of governance.

**December 2010, “Podcast: The Future of Democratization in Afghanistan,”** by Anna Larson. This podcast discusses the findings of a multifaceted study of representative governance in Afghanistan conducted during 2009-10. Across a wide variety of locations and against a backdrop of elections, the research closely observed electoral dynamics at a

local and national level while deliberately expanding the focus to include Afghan attitudes to democracy and democratisation in general.

**December 2010, “Podcast: Community Based Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan,”** by Deborah J. Smith. This podcast discusses AREU’s research on community-based dispute resolution. It presents findings on the relationships between the state and CDR, the different processes and practices that are used across different areas of Afghanistan to resolve disputes, and gender dynamics in these processes.

**December 2010, “Securing Life and Livelihoods in Rural Afghanistan: The Role of Social Relationships,”** by Paula Kantor and Adam Pain. This paper examines how rural households’ position in the web of social relationships that underpins Afghan village life can have a defining effect on their livelihoods. These can vary from charitable relations and informal exchanges of credit—in some cases stretched to breaking point after a prolonged period of drought and deprivation—to exploitative tenancy agreements at the hands of predatory landlords. Local elites—whether self-interested or socially responsible—often play a central role in forging and perpetuating these networks. Households ascribe great value to maintaining their place in village communities as a way to ensure livelihood security, even if doing so may end up detrimental in the long run. Programmes and policies that ignore this reality thus run the risk of falling by the wayside or being co-opted to serve the ends of elites.

**December 2010, “Understanding and Addressing Context in Rural Afghanistan: How Villages Differ and Why,”** by Adam Pain and Paula Kantor. This paper explores how geography, politics, and history conspire to shape the individual character of Afghan villages. Broader regional identities—central or peripheral, mountain or plain—are overlaid onto local factors such as wealth distribution and ethnic diversity to produce individual “village republics” that are more or less capable of organising to deliver both public goods and security. In this context, it suggests that adopting a one-size-fits-all approach is an inefficient way of targeting development resources, and proposes a basic set of tools that can help programme-makers clump villages together based on points of similarity or difference.

## Information Sources


The following websites present a range of papers, raw data, publications and internal documents about Afghanistan. Some have controlled access (e.g., US Government only) while others require accounts and some are completely open.

- **INDURE**—Contains Operational and Event Data, Unclassified Version of CIDNE: <https://indtab.com>
- **TABULE**—Political and economic development data, email and file attachment driven: <https://indtab.com>
- **Ronna**—Finished products fit for public dissemination, synced with Afghanistan Mission Network Portal Wiki: <http://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org>
- **CIMIC Web**—Communications and information sharing with civilian populations, governments and military: <http://www.cimicweb.org>
- **HarmonieWeb**—Unclassified multinational civil-military information sharing, communication during stability operations, humanitarian, and disaster relief: <http://harmonieweb.org>
- **APAN**—Planning, collaboration crisis response and knowledge information, web portal structure: <http://community.apan.org>
- **ADIC**—Geospatial data about infrastructure projects and security incidents: <https://aiscs.ird-hrls.org/aids>
- **AfghanInfo**—Statistical data about the people and economy of Afghanistan: <http://www.cso.gov.af/afghaninf.html>
- **Peace Dividend Marketplace**—Data about local Afghan businesses, market information, business verification: [www.buildingmarkets.org](http://www.buildingmarkets.org)
- **PIMSS**—Federated data about infrastructure, land tenure and governance for the purpose of development; geospatial data: <http://www.pimss.af/AboutPIMSS.html>
- **Intellipedia**—US Government only, information about Afghanistan: [https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Afghanistan\\_Provincial\\_Reconstruction\\_Teams](https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Afghanistan_Provincial_Reconstruction_Teams), [https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Stability\\_Operations\\_and\\_Information\\_Center](https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Stability_Operations_and_Information_Center), [https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Provinces\\_of\\_Afghanistan](https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Provinces_of_Afghanistan)

## New Research Publications

### Agriculture


Parto, Saeed and Rozbih Mihran. "Value Chain Governance and Gender: Saffron Production in Afghanistan." Kabul: Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO), November 2010. 32 p. [http://appro.org.af/downloads/Saffron-VC\\_Governance\\_and\\_Gender.pdf](http://appro.org.af/downloads/Saffron-VC_Governance_and_Gender.pdf) (2.2 MB). "This study was undertaken to identify constraints and explore opportunities for women to participate and improve their position in various stages of saffron production. The findings reported in this paper are



based on primary data collected through interviews with key informants and focus group discussions and secondary data from a review of the existing literature on agricultural value chains, value chain analysis, and gender in/and agricultural development. The review of the literature was used to develop an analytical framework to examine gender in/and value chain dynamics in the case of saffron production." (P. 1).

### Antiquities, Conservation, etc.

Mojumdar, Aunohita with Dilip Banerjee and Anne Feenstra. *Another Afghan Story: Portraying Afghans and their Cultural Heritage*. Leiden: Centre for International Heritage Activities, 2010. 37 p.



This book of portraits with associated notes from interviews includes biographical notes, shows individuals closely associated with the National Museum of Afghanistan and the restoration project underway at the Bagh-e Jehan-Nama Palace (Tashqurghan).


## Banking

**“Summary Analysis of Condition and Performance of the Banking System as of Asad 1389 (August 2010).” [Kabul]: Da Afghanistan Bank, 2010. 16 p. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/AfghanBankingAugust2010.pdf> (472 KB).** This report from the central bank outlines the current state of the banking system, including statistics on microfinance institutions. “The banking system in Afghanistan consists of 17 duly-licensed and permitted banking organizations: 2 relicensed state-owned banks, 10 private full-fledged banks, and 5 branches of foreign banks.” (P. 1).

## Business and Finance

Cusack, Jake and Erik Malmstrom. **“Afghanistan’s Willing Entrepreneurs: Supporting Private-Sector Growth in the Afghan Economy.”** Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security, November 2010. 10 p. [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\\_Kauffman\\_Entrepreneurs\\_CusackMalmstrom.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Kauffman_Entrepreneurs_CusackMalmstrom.pdf) (405 KB). “To better gain [a] perspective [on Afghan business conditions] from the people who matter most—Afghans themselves—we traveled without security and maintained no organizational affiliation. Our central goal was to understand the narratives, challenges and opportunities of Afghan business people in order to inform a more effective strategy to empower them. Our findings, distilled here, will be the subject of a December 2010 report published by the Kauffman Foundation, which will present qualitative research that complements quantitative business surveys conducted by the World Bank and Center for International Private Enterprise.” (P. 1).

**“Integrated Business Enterprise Survey 2009.” [Kabul]: Central Statistics Organization, 2009. 65 p.** This important survey (conducted by the Central Statistics Organization from March to June 2009 in 32 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces) interviewed 3,794 non-agricultural business establishments. It shows that most of them are small (over 90 percent had five workers or less),



are new (have operated for four years or less) and operate with limited physical presence (with around 33 percent in temporary structures and about 1.6 percent in no structure at all). Overall, the survey identified over 402,000 businesses, where nearly 1.2 million people work; about 70 percent of these establishments are in rural areas and 30 percent in urban areas. The majority of businesses had a single owner. Data collected included: number of people employed, their compensation, operating expenses and receipts, value of fixed assets and outstanding loans. Also published in Dari: سروی موسسات افغانستان ۱۳۸۸.

**“Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice (KAP) survey of Afghanistan Towards Trade: Final Survey Report.” Shar-e-Naw, Kabul: TAFE Project Office, October 2010. 64 p. Word documents (1.0 MB, 592 KB).** “This report focuses on Afghans’ knowledge, attitudes, and practices related to trade and its potential benefits for Afghanistan. In response to a request for proposal by Chemonics/TAFE, AIR Consulting undertook the survey design, data collection, and analysis presented here. It used surveys of the general Afghan population across selected provinces and key sub-populations who are involved with various facets of international trade. In addition, in-depth interviews with selected individuals contributed to a deeper understanding of trade issues from the perspective of the government, traders, academia, producers, and other entities in Afghanistan.” (Executive Summary).

**“National Budget 1389” [Kabul]: [Ministry of Finance] 148 p. PDF (1.9 MB).** The Ministry of Finance website (<http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/NationalBudget/Budget/Budget.html>) has only the Dari version for 1389.


## Conflict

Rassul, Khibar. **“Fractured Relationships: Understanding Conflict between Nomadic and Settled Communities in Wardak’s Pastureland.” [Kabul]: Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), October 2010. xii + 28 p. [http://www.cpaug.org.af/Research/Docs\\_our\\_publications/CPAU%20Report%20-%20Fractured%20Relationships.pdf](http://www.cpaug.org.af/Research/Docs_our_publications/CPAU%20Report%20-%20Fractured%20Relationships.pdf) (412 KB).** This paper identifies tangible and intangible vulnerabilities among nomadic and settled communities as a key factor enabling conflict and violence between them. The paper examines recent Afghan political history and the relationship between nomadic and settled communities during this period. This analysis encourages a better understanding of the development of the relationship between the communities during recent history and the role of Afghan politics in this development. The paper also takes a look at recent measures taken to remedy the conflict between nomadic and settled communities and suggests potential ways forward.



## Corruption

“Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: a National Survey 2010.” Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2010. 130 p. <http://www.iwaweb.org/src/IWA%20corruption%20survey%202010.pdf> (4.5 MB). “This is the second corruption survey produced by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA)...the survey was conducted at the end of 2009 in 32 provinces of Afghanistan and is the first truly national corruption survey...The present survey, which covered 6,500 respondents, a representative sample of the overall population of Afghanistan, assesses the impact of corruption on the relationship between Afghan citizens and the state, the trust in state and non-state institutions, the perceived support of the international community for anti-corruption efforts and the links of corruption and perceptions of corruption with insurgency and conflict. While the previous survey focused on perceptions of corruption, the current survey provides a far more comprehensive account of Afghan experiences of corruption.” (Executive Summary, P. 9).



## Development

Adlparvar, Naysan. “Development in Conflict: the Politicisation of British Aid to Afghanistan.” [2010]. 27 p. Unpublished draft. “The findings of this research project pose questions about the British model of development in Afghanistan and beyond. First, they indicate that a portion of British Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Afghanistan—legally mandated for poverty reduction—is being prioritised to meet foreign policy and security goals. This analysis raises the question of whether current patterns of ODA expenditure in Afghanistan would be palatable [to] British taxpayers...” (P. 2-3).

Fishstein, Paul. “Winning Hearts and Minds?: Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Balkh Province.” Medford, Ma.: Feinstein International Center, November 2010. 64 p. <https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/38966405/WinningHearts-Afghanistan.pdf?version=1> (PDF 2.0 MB). “The Balkh Province case study is part of a larger five-province Afghanistan country study looking at the assumption that humanitarian and development assistance projects

can help to bring or maintain security in strategically important environments, and can help ‘win hearts and minds,’ thereby undermining support within the local populace for radical, insurgent, or terrorist groups. Afghanistan provided an opportunity to examine one of the most concerted recent efforts to use ‘hearts and minds’ projects to achieve security objectives. It has been the testing ground for new approaches to using reconstruction assistance as a counterinsurgency tool. The assumption that aid projects improve security has led to a sharp increase in overall development funding, an increased percentage of activities based on strategic security considerations, and a shift of development activities to the military. In this light, it is essential that policy makers understand whether and how aid projects can actually contribute to security. Balkh, a relatively secure and Pashtun minority province, was included as a case study to provide a counterpoint to more-insecure provinces by determining the response to aid in a more-secure environment. Also, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), currently the responsibility of Sweden and Finland, plays less of a role in development projects than do other PRTs, primarily because of the two countries’ policy of separating development and security assistance and channeling most development funding through the Afghan central government in Kabul. Through interviews and focus group discussions with a range of respondents in key institutions and in communities, views were elicited on the drivers of insecurity, characteristics of aid projects and aid implementers (including the military), and effects of aid projects on the popularity of aid actors and on security.” (Executive Summary).

Grissom, Adam. “Making it up as we go Along: State-building, Critical Theory and Military Adaptation in Afghanistan.” *Conflict, Security & Development* (10:4) September 2010, p. 493-517. <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content-content=a926030798-db=all-jumptype=rss> (on-line purchase required) PDF (187 KB). “This article examines the military aspects of international state-building efforts in Afghanistan through the lens of critical theory. It outlines the conventional approach to state-building, as it has evolved in recent decades, and briefly describes the emerging ‘reflexive critique’ of that approach developed by state-building scholars grounded in critical theory. It then applies the reflexive critique to the Afghan state-building project, an exercise that



substantiates key aspects of the critique but also reveals a divergence between the broadly conventional approach taken in Kabul and the more adaptive approaches of many practitioners at the province and district levels. It concludes with a discussion of the potential implications of this convergence for theory and practice of state-building in Afghanistan and beyond.” (P. 493).

**Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 20 July 2010: Communiqué, the Kabul Process, Afghanistan National Development Strategy Prioritization and Implementation Plan, mid-2010-mid-2013.** Kabul: Ministry of Finance, Department of Policy, 2010. 2 v. <http://www.mfa.gov.af/kcs/ANDS%20PIP%20Vol%201%20-%20English.pdf> (1.72 MB; v. 1 only). Volume 1 provides an overview of how the new government cluster coordination mechanism works, outlines the overall budget rationale for all national priority programmes and the amounts allocated per cluster, provides a summary of all major initiatives in each cluster, and maps intended results. Volume 2 “contains the national priority programme summaries for Governance, Economic and Social Development and Security (the “Joint Framework for Ineqal: a Process for Strengthening Peace and Stability in Afghanistan and the Region” and the “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme”) and Regional Cooperation. (v. 2: P. 13).

“[National Priority Programs, Action Plans].” 2010. [80 p.] Word documents and Excel sheets (total 4.0 MB). These Excel sheets document three sets of “six month action plans” resulting from the move to form “clusters” within the Afghan government at the recent Kabul Conference (July 2010): (1) The Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster (05 September 2010); (2) The Human Resource Development Cluster (05 September 2010); and (3) The Governance Cluster (05 September 2010).

“National Solidarity Programme: Activity Profile July 2010”. [Kabul]: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). 1 p. PDF (9.76 MB). A one-page summary of the National Solidarity Programme, including a “Timeline” of the project (2002-2010), “Sector activities” (including a pie chart of sectors by percentage), “Accomplishments,” “Beneficiaries speak” and “International support.”

“Picturing Afghanistan: Village Views of Development.” [Darul Aman, Kabul]: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), National Solidarity Programme (NSP), 2010. 36 p. Booklet on NSP work in each province of Afghanistan, with a page for each province (including a picture and a small inset table showing the sectors for projects, e.g. “Transport,” “Irrigation,” “Power”).

Schmeidl, Susanne and Masood Karokhail. “‘Prêt-a-porter States’: how the McDonaldization of State-

building Misses the Mark in Afghanistan: a Response.” In *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* (Dialogue no. 8). Berlin: Berghof Center, April 2009. p. 67-78. [http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue8\\_schmeidl\\_karokhail\\_comm.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue8_schmeidl_karokhail_comm.pdf) (250 KB). “[T]his short comment focuses on lessons drawn from Afghan statebuilding from the perspective of a hybrid scholar-practitioner looking at states from the bottom-up, rather than from the top-down. The focus on Afghanistan is not only fitting due to my own experience, especially while working with The Liaison Office. The country also seems to provide some perfect examples of hybrid political orders, albeit ones that have been frequently associated with state failure (i.e. when the communist government fell in 1992 and when the Taliban fell in 2001).” (P. 68).

Schmitz, Gerald J. “Canadian Policy toward Afghanistan to 2011 and Beyond: Issues, Prospects, Options.” Ottawa, Canada: Library of Parliament, 27 September 2010. 46 p. <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2010-26-e.pdf> (551 KB). A summary of the involvement of Canada in Afghanistan since 2001, highlighting previous reporting and examining progress in the priority areas identified for Canadian assistance.

“The Voice of [the] Village [videorecording]: documentary film, English.” [Darul Aman, Kabul]: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Public Communication Department, 2009. 10 minute video about the work of the NSP (especially in Nangarhar Province) with some mention of the role of Community Development Councils (CDCs). Includes images of some projects and comments by local officeholders.

Zyck, Stephen A. “Afghanistan: Economic Implications of the July 2010 Kabul Conference.” [Brussels?]: [North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)] Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 01 October, 2010. 6 p. PDF (307 KB). “With media attention following the 20 July 2010 Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan (the ‘Kabul Conference’) focused mainly on the political and security implications of the meeting, which involved more than 76 world leaders, the economic and infrastructure-related implications have received less scrutiny. Yet a review of the Communiqué, which codified the agreements established at the Conference, reflects a range of potential economic effects. The commercial ramifications of the event were also recognised by the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI), which released a statement regarding the private sector’s expectations for the Conference. Key outcomes of the Conference are noted [here] alongside a detailed description and analysis of their implications for Afghanistan’s economy and the main stakeholders engaged in the country’s development.” (P. 1).

## District Delivery Program (DDP)

“Diagnostic of the District Delivery Program.” The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG); Adam Smith International. [Kabul]: Adam Smith International, 3 November 2010. 40 p. PDF (546 KB). An assessment of the District Delivery Program which aims to “rapidly deploy civilian government personnel in recently cleared districts to begin providing public services and establish the legitimacy of the state so the population will stop supporting the insurgency.” (P. 6).

“District Delivery Program Secretariat: Support to the District Delivery Program: Draft Version 2.3.” [Kabul]: The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), [2010?]. 53 p. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/AfghanDistrictDeliveryPlanSecretariat.pdf> (1.0 MB). Foundation document for the setting up of the District Delivery Program: background, overview, strategy, design, management arrangements and terms of reference.

“Initial Lessons Learned.” Kabul: The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), District Delivery Program (DDP), 2010. 5 p. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/AfghanDDPLessons.pdf> (1.2 MB). “This paper attempts to analyze the initial lessons learned after the launch of DDP in the districts of Nad Ali and Marja in Helmand. The analysis covers four major areas of program governance: organization, vision, leadership and stakeholder engagement, benefits realization management, and planning and control. The analysis is based on direct observations made during IDLG field missions to Kandahar, Nad Ali and Marja as well as a number of discussions held with various stakeholders running regular DDP planning meetings and a conference held at the UK Embassy on 11 April 2010.” (P. 1).

Omari, Abdul Baqi. “District Assessment Report: Behsood District, Nangarhar Province.” Kabul: The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), District Delivery Program (DDP), 15 April, 2010. 23 p. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/AfghanBehsoodAssessment.pdf> (3.1 MB). This assessment of Behsood was made on 15 May 2010 by the District Delivery Program and examines governance, politics, rule of law, economic conditions and government service delivery in the district.

## Education


Borchgrevink, Kaja. “Beyond Borders: Diversity and Transnational Links in Afghan Religious Education.” Oslo: Peace Research Institute (PRIO), September 2010. 71 p. ISBN 9788272883620. [http://www.prio.no/sptrans/234636690/PRIO%20Paper\\_%20Borchgrevink\\_%20Beyond%20Borders%20Diversity%20and%20Transnational%20Links%20](http://www.prio.no/sptrans/234636690/PRIO%20Paper_%20Borchgrevink_%20Beyond%20Borders%20Diversity%20and%20Transnational%20Links%20)

in % 2 0 A f g h a n % 2 0 Religious%20Education\_ September%202010.pdf (612 KB). “Do *madrasas* produce terrorists? Are all *madrasas* fundamentalist? In the aftermath of 9/11, *madrasas* have become a subject of great controversy. Yet little is known about the *madrasas* of Afghanistan. This study sets out to find out more about Afghanistan’s religious schools and to move beyond some of the most general stereotypes.” (Introduction, P. 9). A four-page summary based on the main report has also been released: Borchgrevink, Kaja and Kristian Berg Harpviken. “Teaching Rebellion, Taming Rebellion?; Religious Education Reform in Afghanistan.” 4 p.

*ILFE [Inclusive, Learning-Friendly Environment] Toolkit: Adapted Afghan Version: Embracing Diversity: Toolkit for Creating Inclusive, Learning-friendly Environments.* Kabul: UNESCO Kabul, 2010. 19, 25, 22, 37, 28, 27 p.


“This toolkit has been developed by a group of education specialists to address [barriers to education]...that keep children away from school, and prevents them from succeeding within the formal education system. It has been comprehensively revised and adapted by teachers, student teachers, teacher trainers, Ministry of Education officials, as well as education activists working within national and international organizations to address these issues specifically from an Afghan perspective and within an Afghan context.” (Book 1, P. 3). Included are diagrams of the Braille alphabet in Dari and Pashto, as well as sign language guide in both Dari and Pashto (see p. 12).

Lamie, Kathleen. “Afghan Rural Education Initiatives and Analyses.” [Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army], 25 August, 2010. 24 p. PDF (583 KB). This paper briefly surveys Afghanistan’s education system in the twentieth century, then looks at female education in Afghanistan. In addition it covers challenges and obstacles to education from 2001 to the present and includes a look at higher education and the place of minorities in educational achievements.




## Braille and Sign Language Alphabets for Dari and Pashto

### Braille: Dari




### Braille: Pashto



### Sign Language: Dari



### Sign Language: Pashto




Source: ILFE [Inclusive, Learning-Friendly Environment] Toolkit: Adapted Afghan Version: Embracing Diversity: Toolkit for Creating Inclusive, Learning-friendly Environments (see page 11).

## Elections

**“Opening up Elections in Afghanistan [website]”** <http://afghanistanelectiondata.org/> The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has established this useful website (including map downloads) containing data for the four elections held since 2001 in Afghanistan (2004, 2009 Presidential Elections, and 2005, 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections).

**Map showing (by province) percentage of female Wolesi Jirga candidates**




**“The Preliminary List of Potential Winners of the Wolesi Jirga Election [2010]. [2010]. [7] p.** <http://hsrp.typepad.com/files/wolseijirga-preliminarylistopotentialwinners.pdf> (123 KB). A preliminary listing (in English) released around 20 October showing the successful candidates in each province.

**“Recommendations for Electoral Reform in Afghanistan: a Compendium of Electoral Reform Recommendations in Afghanistan,”** prepared by Jed Ober. [Kabul]: Democracy International, April 2010. 63 p. <http://afghan2010.com/sites/default/files/2010-04-DI-Consensus%20Electoral%20Reform%20Recommendations-ENG.pdf> (1.25 MB). “The problems which plague Afghanistan’s election system are complex and wide ranging. Similarly, opinions for solutions to these problems are diverse. This document presents a collection of electoral reform recommendations in an attempt to identify consensus among major international and domestic stakeholders to Afghanistan’s election process. A wide range of sources were consulted with dates of release spanning the modern period in which elections have taken place in Afghanistan. More than 50 sources were consulted which contain nearly 900 recommendations. While the author went to great lengths to include as broad a range of sources as possible, inevitably, additional sources could inform the electoral reform

discussion in Afghanistan. Each source was assigned a unique reference ID. Reform recommendations are listed with source reference IDs, page numbers where the recommendation can be found, and in the event sources assigned specific numbers to recommendations, the recommendation number. Recommendations are organized by categories with specific relevance to Afghanistan’s election system. While some recommendations could be grouped in multiple categories, all effort was made to organize recommendations in categories most relevant to their substantive focus. Similar recommendations are then grouped to show consensus, and in some cases, variance of opinions. These groupings were then used to produce a list of consensus recommendations. These consensus recommendations are summarized in the chart below and discussed in greater detail in a separate document titled *Consensus Recommendations for Electoral Reform in Afghanistan.*” (Overview).

**“US Election Observation Mission to the Afghanistan Presidential and Provincial Council Elections 2009: Final Report Revised and Updated.”** Bethesda, Maryland: Democracy International, August 2010. 144 p. <http://www.democracyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/DI-Afghanistan-2009-Final-Report-web.pdf> (1.57 MB). “On August 20, 2009, Afghanistan held critical presidential and provincial council elections. Although these were not the first competitive elections held in Afghanistan, they were the first elections run by an Afghan election commission since the fall of the Taliban. The elections were a major test of the country’s prospects for democracy and political stability. Despite the threat of serious, widespread violence, millions of Afghans turned out to vote in the elections, and initially it appeared they had engaged in a reasonable democratic process, given the conflict that afflicted the country. As the process continued after election day, however, it became apparent that fraud had been widespread. A controversial method for determining the final results further undermined the integrity of the election. Ultimately, the process set back the near-term prospects for a democratic Afghanistan. Under a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Democracy International organized an international election observation mission for the 2009 elections in Afghanistan. The purpose of DI’s mission was to observe and report on the electoral process—including pre-election preparations, election day, and the post-election process—and, to the extent possible, to evaluate the degree to which the elections conformed to international standards. In so doing, the mission would help promote good governance by strengthening democratic election systems and processes. The project complemented ongoing efforts supported by the U.S. government and others to help build a

more participatory, representative, and accountable democracy in Afghanistan. The DI observation mission deployed a team of 62 long- and short-term observers, including noted experts in election administration, election monitoring, and Afghan politics. DI deployed its core team and long-term observers (LTOs) to Kabul in late July. LTOs were joined by short-term observers (STOs) for the week around election day. On election day, the observers visited 13 provinces. DI also conducted a postelection assessment of the impact of the elections on the political climate in Afghanistan and has closely monitored postelection developments.” (Executive Summary, P. 1).



## Electricity

***South East Power System (SEPS) information presentation, March 30, 2010.*** [Kabul?]: Black & Veatch, 2010. 33 p. PDF (880 KB). Outline of the systems and work needed to restore parts of the electricity grid in Lashkar Gah, Kandahar and associated areas.

## Human Rights

[UNAMA Mapping Report on Human Rights Abuses in Afghanistan 1978-2001]. [2005]. 296 p. Unpublished report. <http://www.flagrancy.net/salvage/UNMappingReportAfghanistan.pdf> (1.77 MB). “In 2003, UNHCHR initiated a...modest mapping exercise in Afghanistan. Based on open source material, most of it the UN’s own, a team of three consultants compiled a 300 page report on human rights violations and war crimes in Afghanistan in the civil war years between 1978 and 2001. The report contains detailed accounts of indiscriminate bombings, massacres, illegal detention, torture, rape and looting from the communist period to the fall of the Taliban regime. In January 2005, then UNHCHR commissioner Louise Arbour travelled to Kabul to release the mapping report simultaneously with the release of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission’s national consultation about Afghans’ opinions about how to deal with legacies of human rights violations and war crimes, entitled “A Call for Justice.” At the eleventh hour a decision was taken not to release the UN mapping report. The UNHCHR participated in the launch of the AIHRC’s “A Call for Justice” report, and handed a copy of her report to the Commission as a basis for future documentation work. Commissioner

Arbour then met with President Karzai and presented him with a copy of the report. The report has to date not been officially released, but copies of it have done the rounds of human rights organizations, embassies, web sites etc.” (Afghanistan Analysts’ Network website, <http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=1217> [accessed 14 October 2010]).


## Information Management

[Papers from Knowledge Management Symposium, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 5, 2010]. Kabul: [ISAF?], 2010. PDFs (12.3 MB). Contents: “Afghan Geodesy & Cartography Head Office (AGCHO),” Hassibullah Samadi (20 p.); “Central Statistics Office, Afghanistan: Official Statistics and Information Products Developed with the Support of the UN” (20 p.); “Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) and ‘CivicWeb’ Prototype,” Kjell Aanensen (15 p.); “Rule of Law; Situational Awareness Site” (9 p.); “Human Terrain System: Knowledge Sharing and Challenges,” John H. Calvin (11 p.); “Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) Courseware and Capabilities Catalog” (126, A1-A5 p.); “Knowledge Management Symposium: Telecom Presentation.” Antonio Loda (4 p.); “AMN-U Transition to Operations,” NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (10 p.); and “Finding and Distributing Data about Afghan-owned Businesses” (10 p.). Bound with “ISAF Joint Command Information Dominance Center,” Guido Altendorf (8 p.).

## Insurgency

“Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review.” [Washington, D.C.]: [Department of State], 2010. 5 p. [http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/12.15.10\\_APAR\\_Overview\\_Final.pdf](http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/12.15.10_APAR_Overview_Final.pdf) (39 KB). Outlining of the US strategy in Afghanistan, following a policy review in late-2010.

Peters, Gretchen. “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.” West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2010. 90 p. [http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC\\_CrimeandInsurgencyintheTribalAreasofAfghanistanandPakistan.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_CrimeandInsurgencyintheTribalAreasofAfghanistanandPakistan.pdf) (2.0 MB). “Insurgent and terror groups operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are deepening their involvement in organized crime, an aspect of the conflict that at once presents enormous challenges and also potential opportunities for Coalition forces trying to implement a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Within a realm of poor governance and widespread state corruption, anti-state actors engage in and protect organized crime—mainly smuggling, extortion and kidnapping—both to raise funds and also to spread fear



and insecurity, thus slowing the pace of development and frustrating attempts to extend the rule of law and establish a sustainable licit economy. Militant groups on either side of the frontier function like a broad network of criminal gangs, not just in terms of the activities in which they engage, but also in the way they are organized, how funds

flow through their command chains and how they interact—and sometimes fight—with each other. There is no doubt that militant groups have capitalized on certain public grievances, yet their ties to criminal profiteering, along with the growing number of civilian casualties they cause on both sides of the frontier, have simultaneously contributed to a widening sense of anger and frustration among local communities. Through a series of focused and short anecdotal case studies, this paper aims to map out how key groups engage in criminal activity in strategic areas, track how involvement in illicit activity is deepening or changing and illustrate how insurgent and terror groups impose themselves on local communities as they spread to new territory. It is hoped that a closer examination of this phenomenon will reveal opportunities for disrupting the problem, as well as illustrate how Coalition forces, the international community and moderate Muslim leaders might capitalize on an untapped public relations opportunity by better protecting local communities who are the main victims of it.” (Executive Summary).


## Justice

Afghanistan. Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF). “Annual Report.” Kabul: Communications Directorate, Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), 2010. 8 p. This report for 1388 summarises the cases and convictions achieved by this specialised government agency. Their website is <http://www.cjtf.gov.af/>.


Carter, Stephen and Kate Clark. “No Shortcut to Stability: Justice, Politics and Insurgency in Afghanistan.” London: Chatham House, December 2010. 38 p. ISBN 9781962032408. [http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/download/-/id/985/file/18074\\_1210pr\\_afghanjustice.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/download/-/id/985/file/18074_1210pr_afghanjustice.pdf) (2.3 MB). “This report seeks to investigate the relationship between issues of justice (including governance and respect for human rights) and stability in Afghanistan, especially,

although not exclusively, in relation to the rise of violent insurgency. It is based on approximately 40 interviews, carried out between December 2009 and August 2010. The authors spoke to a wide range of Afghan and international interlocutors and conducted an extensive review of existing documentary sources. Except where specified, any policy points in the text are intended equally for the international authorities and for the Afghan government, which of course has the first responsibility for policy on justice issues. When discussing the armed opposition, the authors refer solely to the Taliban, who make up the bulk of insurgent forces, although they are far from a monolithic movement. However, most of our analysis could also refer to other smaller groups, such as Hizb-e Islami.” (Introduction, P. [1]).

“Confinement Conditions at a US Screening Facility on Bagram Air Base.” [Kabul?]: Open Society Institute, October 14, 2010. 16 p. [http://www.soros.org/initiatives/mena/articles\\_publications/publications/confinement-conditions-20101014/confinement-conditions-20101014.pdf](http://www.soros.org/initiatives/mena/articles_publications/publications/confinement-conditions-20101014/confinement-conditions-20101014.pdf) (162 KB). Accounts by Afghans about their treatment in a detention centre on Bagram Air Base, near Kabul, including allegations of mistreatment and abuse. The information comes from interviews in July 2010 with more than 20 former detainees, 18 of whom stated that they were detained in the Tor (“Black”) Jail.



De Lauri, Antonio, “Legal Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Rule of Law, Injustice, and Judicial Mediation.” 2010. *Jura Gentium: Journal of Philosophy of International Law and Global Politics*, 6 (2010) 1, p. 1-28. <http://www.juragentium.unifi.it/en/surveys/wlgo/delauri/index.htm> PDF (199 KB). “The present article is based on field research carried out in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2008. For the most part, the research was conducted at the Second District Court of Kabul, the Provincial Office and the Prosecutor’s Office of District 11. During my fieldwork I directly observed twenty court cases (both criminal



and civil), in order to examine the ordinary daily practice of law. Thus, by the means of an ethnographic analysis of 'Afghan justice', I have tried to investigate the daily implications of a 'legal expansion' conveyed by the international agencies. I also conducted several interviews with judges and prosecutors, whose point of view emerged as being crucial to understanding the 'life' of judiciary institutions. In addition, the ethnographic analysis was prompted by a series of interviews carried out with aid workers, administrative officials, international organizations experts, and members of the customary assemblies. My thoughts and observations are a critical reflection on the legal reconstruction which the international community and the Afghan government initiated in 2001." (P. 1).

Hagerott, Mark R., Thomas J. Umberg and Joseph A. Jackson. "A Patchwork Strategy of Consensus: Establishing Rule of Law in Afghanistan." *JFQ* Issue 59 (4<sup>th</sup> quarter) 2010, p. 143-146. [http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59\\_TOC.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_TOC.pdf) (640 KB). Description of legal reform processes in Afghanistan, with some suggestions for improvements.

"The Huquq Department: an Analysis of its Procedures, Functions and Needs". [Kabul]: UNAMA, UNDP, July 2010. 12 p. Word document (172 KB). "The Huquq Department of the Ministry of Justice has important roles to play in resolving civil disputes and enforcing civil judgments throughout Afghanistan, and essential linkages with other parts of the formal justice system and traditional justice networks. The role of the Department, however, is not always clearly understood. This paper, prepared by the Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism (PJCM), is an attempt to fill that gap by considering how the Huquq Department operates including its strengths and limitations, to assess the legal framework, and thereby to encourage greater support and assistance from the donor community and the local institutions. In carrying out this assessment, the PJCM met with Huquq and justice officials throughout Afghanistan, as well as with international partners, in order to obtain a sufficient cross-section of information on which to build general suggestions." (P. 1).

"Linkages between State and Non-state Justice Systems in Eastern Afghanistan: Evidence from Jalalabad, Nangarhar and Ahmad Aba, Paktia." Kabul: TLO, May 2009. 28 p. <http://www.tlo-afghanistan.org/sites/default/files/Working-Paper-Series/TLO-Linkages-between-state-and-non-state-justice-systems-in-eastern-Afghanistan.pdf> (521 KB). "Historically the Afghan state administration, including the court system, has never had full control over the entire country. For the vast majority of rural Afghans, local governance, security and justice administration was and is provided through non-

state, religious and informal community bodies. The relationship between state and non-state institutions has often been conflictual, and attempts at effectively expanding the jurisdiction of the state have frequently sparked rebellion. At the same time, the relationship between the two systems is often characterised by degrees of recognition, coordination and cooperation. Today as throughout the last century, the state justice sector suffers from a severe lack of capacity and is mistrusted as corrupt and ineffective by the majority of the population. As a result between 80-90 percent of all civil disputes and criminal offenses in the country are dealt with through informal institutions. This report maps the formal and informal justice institutions as well as the interactions and linkages between them in two districts in the majority Pashtun East and Southeast of Afghanistan, one urban (a *nahia* of Jalalabad) and one rural (Ahmad Aba in Paktia)." (Executive Summary).

Merrell, David E. "State Engagement with Non-state Justice: how the Experience in Kyrgyzstan can Reinforce the Need for Legitimacy in Afghanistan." *Central Asian Survey* v. 29 (no. 2) June 2010: 205-217. "Currently there is a question of whether and how Afghanistan should engage non-state councils of elders to resolve disputes. In order to harness their benefits (e.g. efficiency), control their abuses (e.g. occasional controversial resolutions), and stabilize the resolution of disputes, some have argued that formal links should be established between the state judicial system and non-state councils of elders in Afghanistan. Others argue that mere informal links between the two systems should be established. Still others suggest that prior models of state engagement in Afghanistan should be revived. In Kyrgyzstan, just 65 miles north of Afghanistan, the Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet administrations have used various methods to engage non-state councils of elders. Despite these vastly different attempts at controlling local dispute resolutions, elders independently resolved disputes outside of Tsarist and Soviet control and continue to resolve disputes outside of post-Soviet state control in Kyrgyzstan. This phenomenon highlights the need for legitimacy in any models of state engagement that are considered for Afghanistan. If, as observed in Kyrgyzstan, people do not use state-sanctioned local councils in Afghanistan, then their purposes may be frustrated. Therefore, in addition to reviewing the experience with state engagement in other parts of the world, policy makers in Afghanistan should also review the historical and contemporary experience with state engagement in Kyrgyzstan. As the need for legitimacy is reconsidered and applied to the design of models for Afghanistan, it may be more likely that those models will be used by more people in Afghanistan and that their purposes will be furthered." (P. 205).



**“Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary.”** [Brussels]: International Crisis Group, 17 November 2010. 39 p. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx> PDF (2.6 MB). “Afghanistan’s justice system is in a catastrophic state of disrepair. Despite repeated pledges over the last nine years, the majority of Afghans still have little or no access to judicial institutions. Lack of justice has destabilised the country and judicial institutions have withered to near non-existence. Many courts are inoperable and those that do function are understaffed. Insecurity, lack of proper training and low salaries have driven many judges and prosecutors from their jobs. Those who remain are highly susceptible to corruption. Indeed, there is very little that is systematic about the legal system, and there is little evidence that the Afghan government has the resources or political will to tackle the challenge. The public, consequently, has no confidence in the formal justice sector amid an atmosphere of impunity. A growing majority of Afghans have been forced to accept the rough justice of Taliban and criminal powerbrokers in areas of the country that lie beyond government control. To reverse these trends, the Afghan government and international community must prioritise the rule of law as the primary pillar of a vigorous counter-insurgency strategy that privileges the protection of rights equally alongside the protection of life. Restoration of judicial institutions must be at the front and centre of the strategy aimed at stabilising the country.” (Executive Summary).

**“Restoring Justice in Afghanistan: Legal Traditions and Current Problems.”** Afghanistan Research Reachback Center White Paper. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: TRADOC G2 Human Terrain System, United States Army, July 2010. 36 p. PDF (310 KB). “This paper argues that current legal reforms in Afghanistan favor western-styled statutory law over all else and do not account for local realities. Instead, such reforms are heavily biased foreign impositions that have little connection to the well established forms of dispute resolution and customary law in the country. The significance of this from a policy perspective is that, based on historical patterns and traditions in Afghanistan, attempting to force a foreign system on top of an existing one without regard for the local context is likely to be rejected by the population. There is a universal agreement among NGOs, researchers and other organizations who have conducted primary research in the country that the current situation calls for a ‘bottom-up’ rather than a ‘top-down’ approach towards legal reform. Due to their rooting in local communities, customary dispute resolution bodies are equipped to handle a myriad of cases with a contextual understanding of the issues and individuals

involved and require little or no infrastructure to do so. Thus, emphasis and focus needs to be placed on working within local customary traditions before any functioning national justice system can be established.” (P. 1); “This report is a review of existing English language literature pertaining to customary, statutory and Shari’a law in Afghanistan. It does not represent original research on this topic.” (P. 4).

**Special Bulletin of the Supreme Court.** [Kabul]: Supreme Court [of Afghanistan]. This new periodical has been issued for the first time on 17 October 2010, with parallel text in English and Dari. The first issue provides a very brief overview of the main activities of the judiciary in the past four years and very brief notes on work against corruption, legal document archives, coordination amongst judicial entities, the work of the Counter Narcotics Primary Court, etc. Title in Pashto: د قضائیه ځواک خاصه څېړونه Available from the Publications Directorate of the Supreme Court (ahmadi\_s123@yahoo.com ph. 020 230 0361 or 0700 456 453).

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**Tarzi, Amin. “Recalibrating the Afghan Reconciliation Program.”** *Prism* 1 (no. 4) [September 2010], p. 67-78. [http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1-4/Prism\\_67-78\\_Tarzi.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1-4/Prism_67-78_Tarzi.pdf) (540 KB). “In December 2001, the framers of the Bonn Agreement laid out a plan to end conflict in Afghanistan, heal a divided, wounded nation, and bring about lasting peace. However, nine years later, stability remains elusive, and these goals have yet to be fully realized. Theories abound but are ever evolving as to how to make progress; bright new ideas are mixed with transplanted success stories but yield unsatisfactory results. One area that has warranted much attention is the promotion of national reconciliation. Reintegration and reconciliation are recognized as key strategies to conducting a successful counterinsurgency. Reintegration focuses on individuals within enemy ranks who can be incentivized to abandon their allegiance to the cause; reconciliation offers amnesty and political position to enemy leadership to bring them into the fold. Such efforts have been under way in some fashion since the Taliban lost control of Kandahar, its last major stronghold. However, lacking a cohesive, cogent strategy, the various local and international promoters of reconciliation often undermine each other’s efforts and confuse their target audiences—the Afghan people and insurgents—emboldening an otherwise fragmented

enemy and forcing a large segment of Afghans to seek alternative measures for their future safety. A critical eye on the past and frank discussions with senior Afghan government officials should elucidate the present and offer lessons learned and insights into how to realize national reconciliation.” (P. 67-68).



## Labour Supply

**“An Urban Based Study of Labour Supply and Demand, and Public Opinion, Covering the Media, Tourism and Hospitality Sectors.”** [Kabul]: Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, December 2009. [103] p. PDF (796 KB). “This study was carried out...in five provincial capital cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, Balkh, Herat and Kandahar with the following objectives: (1) to study labour supply and demand in media, tourism, and hospitality sectors in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Balkh, and Nangarhar provinces, the five biggest provincial capitals of Afghanistan; (2) to obtain public opinions and preferences related to media sector in Afghanistan; (3) to obtain tourist opinions on tourist facilities, services, source of information, and perception of value for money; (4) to obtain hotel clients opinions on provision/services of hospitality sector.” (Foreword).

## Land

Burke, Cristin A. “Origins, Impact, and Workings of Afghan Land Mafias.” Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army, 19 August 2010. 8 p. PDF (618 KB). “The difficult process of establishing land ownership in Afghanistan is further complicated by the practice of illegal land seizures by the ‘land mafia.’ Individuals involved with the land mafia are frequently well-connected government officials or military commanders...there is little recourse and usually no compensation provided for those who had their property confiscated. Little change can be expected as long as high-ranking officials and powerbrokers fail to recognize the property rights of citizens.” (P. 2).

## Media

**“Afghan Media in 2010: Synthesis Report.”** Kabul: Altai Consulting, 12 October 2010. 178 p. <http://www.altaiconsulting.com/docs/media/> PDFs (total 9.2 MB). “In 2004-2005, the United States Agency

for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives commissioned Altai Consulting to conduct the first comprehensive media evaluation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, looking at the impact of the Afghan media on opinions and behaviors three years after the beginning of the country’s reconstruction. The evaluation found, among other things: that Afghans were avid and sophisticated media users and that cultural barriers to media use were less significant than previously expected; that the radio played a predominant role throughout the country; and that media are instrumental in social progress and education. However, since publication of that report, Afghanistan’s media sector has seen important changes. To inform future assistance from the international community to the Afghan media, it was deemed necessary to assess the current state of the Afghan media - by reflecting a full and accurate audience profile, to determine program preferences, to measure the impact of the Afghan media on local opinions and behaviors and to gauge Afghan expectations in terms of programming and messaging. A large-scale research project was thus planned and conducted from March to August 2010. This research included a deep probe into the media sector and the public’s behaviors and expectations. The methodology used to achieve this included a combination of: literature review; direct observations; key informant interviews with most relevant actors involved in the media sector; 6,648 close-ended interviews in more than 900 towns and villages of 106 districts, covering all 34 provinces of the country; an audience survey on more than 1,500 individuals run daily for a week; about 200 qualitative, open-ended interviews; and 10 community case studies. Such an effort guarantees that results presented here are fairly representative of the Afghan population at large. This document provides a comprehensive synthesis of data collected during the survey. A database of media actors, 16 priority district reports, 10 case study reports, a complete description of the methodology and the original datasets from the main quantitative research and the audience research are publicly available, allowing anyone interested to access more focused information as needed.” (P. 8).

## Municipalities

**RAMP UP East Public Opinion Survey, all Cities: Asadabad, Jalalabad, Mehterlam, Parun, Panjshir, Charikar, Mahmud Raqi, Ghazni, Gardez, Khost, Sharana, Bamyán, Puli Alam and Maidan Shahr.** Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations, Regional Command East (RAMP UP East). li, 54 p.; charts; 30 cm. [Kabul?]: RAMP UP, October 2010. PDF (480 KB). “Through the Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP UP), USAID is supporting 14 municipalities in

Eastern Afghanistan to improve local governance, addressing infrastructure, service delivery, leadership and management capacity. [RAMP UP East] started in June 2010 with the purpose of creating effective, responsive, democratic, transparent, accountable, municipal governance in the fourteen provinces that comprise the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF's) Regional Command East. The provincial municipalities are Asadabad, Jalalabad, Mehtarlam, Parun, Panjshir, Charikar, Mehmod Raqi, Ghazni, Gardiz, Khost, Sharana, Bamyan, Puli Alam and Maidan Shahr...To assess the success of the programs in these municipalities an annual survey of residents of these 14 cities is being conducted to measure the change in citizen perspectives about governance and services. In the first year (2010) it was only possible to conduct interviews in 13 of the cities; no surveys were completed in Parun. This report outlines the results for all of the cities where the baseline survey was conducted. Interviews were completed with 3,226 residents in August and September, 2010. Demographics Enumerators visited 3,226 houses in eastern Afghanistan and interviewed one representative in each home. Of those interviewed, 35% were women, 81% were married and 41% had never attended school. Respondents spanned a wide age range: 42% were 30 years old or younger, 28% were 31 to 40 and 30% were over 40. Most households (76%) owned their homes and had an *Oabala* or other way of showing their ownership." (P. 1).

## Natural Resources

**Afghan Hydrocarbons: Addressing Corruption to Fuel Development?** Bergen, Norway: CMI-U4, September, 2010. [4] p. <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3787-afghan-hydrocarbons.pdf> (1.2 MB). "Use of Afghanistan's oil and gas resources, if properly handled, could have considerable spinoff effects for development and reduce dependence on high-cost energy from neighbouring countries. But mistrust between local and central authorities, and a perception among domestic and international actors that corruption risks are widespread, suggests that governing the country's hydrocarbons will be far from straightforward. Specific corruption challenges are compounded by insufficient skills and coordination within the hydrocarbon sector, plus the ongoing fragility of security where resources are located. Given these constraints, donors should seek further clarity from Afghan authorities on how they aim to develop and use their hydrocarbon resources, including how they plan to address corruption risks." (P. 1).

**Bader, Harry R. [et al.] "The Afghanistan Timber Trade: an Evaluation of the Interaction between the Insurgency, GIROA [Government of the Islamic**


**Republic of Afghanistan] and Criminality in the Task Force Bastogne Area of Operations (Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman, and Nangarhar): a Report Released by the Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell (NRCC), Joint Civ-Mil Team Task Force."** [Nangarhar]: Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell (NRCC), 21 July 2010. 30 p. PDF (524 KB). An assessment of the extent of forest damage forms illegal logging and investigation of linkages between black market smuggling of timber, the insurgency and social disruption in Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar.

**"The Minerals Law, February 14, 2010."** [Kabul: Ministry of Mines], 2010. 53 p. <http://www.mom.gov.af/uploads/files/English/Minerals%20Law-2010%20Feb-16.pdf> (231 KB). "This Law shall enter into force as of the date of promulgation and shall be published in the Official Gazette. Upon its enforcement, the Minerals Law dated 20/05/1384 published in Official Gazette number (859) and other provisions inconsistent with this Law shall be void." (Article 105).

**"Mining Regulations, February 12, 2010."** [Kabul: Ministry of Mines], 2010. 61 p. <http://www.mom.gov.af/uploads/files/English/Mining%20Regulations-2010%20Feb-16.pdf> (264 KB). Regulations governing all aspects of mining in Afghanistan, enacted pursuant to Article 100 of the Minerals Law.

## Opium

**Afghanistan opium survey 2010: summary findings.** Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 29 p. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afg\\_opium\\_survey\\_2010\\_exsum\\_web.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afg_opium_survey_2010_exsum_web.pdf) (3.2 MB).



## Police

**"Afghan Local Police in Zeer-e-Koh Valley: Populace Perspectives and a Linguistic Anthropological Assessment."** [Herat?]: Human Terrain Team (HTT) AF15, 24 August, 2010. Word document (140 KB). 10 p. "This report focuses on populace perceptions of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in Zeer-e-Koh Valley or of similar programs throughout Afghanistan."

**Caldwell, William B. and Nathan K. Finney. "Building Police Capacity in Afghanistan: the Challenges of a Multilateral Approach."** *Prism* 2 (no. 1) (2010) p. 121-130. <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/>

**prism2-1/Prism\_121-130\_Caldwell-Finney.pdf (688 KB).** “From the Bonn Agreement in 2001 to today, at least seven non-Afghan organizations have been created by the international community to support the reconstruction of a police force. The lack of unity of effort among these organizations created obstacles to developing this necessary force. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was activated in November 2009 to overcome this lack of unity of effort, as well as attempt to bring greater coherence to the generation, development, training, and sustainment efforts for the ANP. Since its establishment, NTM-A has embarked on a new approach that includes greater synchronization of efforts with partner nations and organizations. To prosecute the new approach, NTM-A formed C3 relationships—not command, control, and communications—but cooperation, collaboration, and coordination with all of these organizations.” (P. 121).

## Politics and Government

**“Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement.”** Kabul/Brussels: International Crisis Group (ICG), 2010. 11 p. [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B115%20Afghanistan%20--%20Exit%20vs%20Engagement.ashx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B115%20Afghanistan%20--%20Exit%20vs%20Engagement.ashx) PDF (400 KB). A critical overview of the current security, development and political situation in Afghanistan, particularly as it relates to the current international military presence and activities.

**Goodhand, Jonathan and David Mansfield. “Drugs and (Dis)order: a Study of the Opium Trade, Political Settlements and State-making in Afghanistan.”** London: Crisis States Programme, Crisis States Research Centre, November, 2010. 48 p. <http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP83.2.pdf> (679 KB). “This paper represents one contribution to a wider research project led by the Crisis States Programme, which examines how patterns of resource mobilisation and rent appropriation, in war to peace transitions, shape wider political relations and institutions. The research aims to test the hypothesis that particular types and patterns of rent appropriation may contribute to more inclusive/exclusive political settlements which translates into more/less stability of the state. Here we are primarily concerned with the political economy of post-Bonn Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the role of the drugs industry and its impacts upon processes of state-building and peace-building. Section one introduces [the] theoretical framework and background on the Afghan case. Section two gives an overview of the structural characteristics and contemporary dynamics of the drugs industry. Section three provides a comparative analysis of the linkages between drugs, the political

settlement and post conflict state-building, through three provincial level studies. Section four building on the case studies and relevant literature draws out some of the underlying relationships and broader patterns connecting drugs, violence and political coalitions in Afghanistan. Section five outlines some tentative conclusions and broader theoretical and policy implications.” (Introduction).

**Harpviken, Kristian Berg. “Afghanistan in a Neighbourhood Perspective: General Overview and Conceptualization.”** Oslo: Peace Research Institute (PRIO), 2010. 28 p. <http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-2075913708/Harpviken,%20KB%20%282010%29%20Afghanistan%20in%20a%20neighbourhood%20perspective.pdf> (494 KB). “For over three decades, Afghanistan has been a battleground in which many of the states of the larger neighbourhood have been involved. The importance of fostering a concerted effort for Afghan peace and stability is increasingly agreed upon. Some analysts emphasize states and their security relationships and see Afghanistan as an ‘insulator’ caught between different regional state systems, each with a strong dynamic of their own. An alternative perspective—which also seems to inform the new US analysis—emphasizes various transnational networks, and sees Afghanistan as the ‘core’ of a larger conflict formation. This paper takes the former perspective—codified by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver in the Regional Security Complex approach—as its starting point. It pursues the security dynamics

of each of the core regions surrounding Afghanistan (South Asia, the Persian Gulf and [Central] Asia), taking a comparative and historical perspective, with an emphasis on the period since the late 1970s. It concludes that each of Afghanistan’s three surrounding regions is characterized by deep security concerns that have little to do with Afghanistan. These concerns nonetheless inform their engagement in Afghanistan, which comes to reflect conflicts and cleavages specific to the region. One implication is that for Afghanistan, it may be a more promising strategy to seek a unilateral non-offensive or neutral status, rather than security integration with its neighbours. While this would necessitate a forum of Afghanistan’s neighbours in order to foster understanding for the Afghan position, it suggests a dramatic departure from mainstream policy proposals with their emphasis on an integrated regional approach.” (Back Cover).



Harpviken, Kristian Berg. "Caught in the Middle: Regional Perspectives on Afghanistan." *Comparative Social Research* 27 (2010): 277-305. [http://www.prio.no/misc/Download.aspx?file=%2fadmin%2fPublication+File%2fHarpviken+\(2010\)+Caught+in+the+middle+--+Regional+Perspectives+on+Afghanistan.pdf](http://www.prio.no/misc/Download.aspx?file=%2fadmin%2fPublication+File%2fHarpviken+(2010)+Caught+in+the+middle+--+Regional+Perspectives+on+Afghanistan.pdf) (248 KB). "For over three decades, Afghanistan has been a battleground in which many of the states of the wider neighbourhood have been involved. The importance of fostering a concerted effort for Afghan peace and stability is widely agreed upon, yet such a process remains difficult to bring about. Some analysts emphasize states and their security relationships, seeing Afghanistan as an 'insulator' caught between different regional state systems, each with a strong dynamic of its own. Other analysts emphasize various transnational networks and see Afghanistan as the 'core' of a larger conflict formation. This chapter takes as its starting point the former perspective, which has been codified by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003) as the regional security complex (RSC) approach. The chapter examines the security dynamics of each of the regions surrounding Afghanistan—South Asia, the Persian Gulf and [Central] Asia—adopting a comparative and historical perspective, with an emphasis on the period since the late 1970s. It concludes that each of Afghanistan's three surrounding regions is characterized by deep security concerns of its own. These concerns nonetheless inform the engagement of neighbouring countries in Afghanistan, which then comes to reflect conflicts and cleavages specific to the respective regions. One central implication is that a more promising strategy for Afghanistan might be to seek a unilateral non-offensive or neutral status, rather than full security integration with its neighbours. Although such a strategy would necessitate the creation of a forum for Afghanistan's neighbours to foster understanding for the Afghan position, it represents a dramatic departure from mainstream policy proposals with their emphasis on an integrated regional approach." (Abstract).

Harpviken, Kristian Berg. "Understanding Warlordism: Three Biographies from Afghanistan's Southeastern Area." Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2010. 27p. <http://www.prio.no/Research-and-Publications/Publication/?oid=61303515> (1.2 MB). "How do 'warlords'—defined in the Afghan context both by their military skills and capacity to strike a balance between local and external sources of support—respond when the war they are fighting ends? Why do some choose compliance with the new political order while others remain engaged in various forms of opposition? The political biographies of three longstanding warlords of the largely Pashtun southeast of Afghanistan—Mullah Rocketi, Qari Baba, and Jalaluddin Haqqani—enable us to explore the dynamics of quite different responses. The 2001 US-led intervention

and the transitional challenges that followed led the three men in different directions. Rocketi took up a political career, was elected to parliament in 2005, and four years later remained an active player in legal politics. Qari Baba served briefly as a governor but was dethroned to the position of a security advisor and then assassinated (probably by local Taliban). Haqqani stayed with the Taliban to become one of its most central commanders and by late 2009 led one of the major militant groups in the insurgency. All three had emerged as commanders during the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s. Notwithstanding the considerable social and political similarities in the context where they operated and the challenges they faced, their personal trajectories diverged in the post-2001 period. This paper will try to understand why this was so: Why did one man lay down his arms to become a politician, another place his capacity for commanding violence at the service of the new Karzai government, while the third continued to challenge the new rulers with armed force? The analysis of these trajectories will provide an insight into the nature of violent warlordism during the formal transition from war to peace and into the postconflict period." (P. 1).

"The Istanbul Declaration: Fourth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA IV): (Istanbul, 2-3 November 2010)." [Kabul?]: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010. 8 p. <http://mof.gov.af/download/en/1289628636.pdf> (928 KB). Recommendations released after Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA IV) in Istanbul, relating to infrastructure projects, trade, transit and border management, educational and vocational training, agriculture, labour migration, etc.

"Mizan District [Zabul Province]: the People, the Economy and Development." [Kandahar?]: Human Terrain Team (HTT), AF8, August 2010. 37 p. PDF (3.3 MB). "This report covers the attitudes of the population of Mizan District and the situation with regard to security, the economy, development and the government. It also lists tribes, leaders and villages. The report concentrates on the Mizan valley, which is where the efforts of the government and security forces are currently concentrated. This study is compiled from 28 in-depth interviews." (Executive Summary).

"Model Province." [IDC [?] Governance Team]. [Kabul?]: NATO, [2010]. 9 p. Bound with "Model District." (17 p.). Word documents (156, 284 KB). Descriptions of the structures, functions and staffing (including salary levels and pay rates) of a model (ideal) Afghan province (and district), information for security forces attempting to work with provincial administrations.

**Mukhopadhyay, Dipali.** “Disguised Warlordism and Combantanthood in Balkh: the Persistence of Informal Power in the Formal Afghan State.” *Conflict, Security & Development* 9:4 (2009) p. 535-564. “This paper considers disarmament efforts in northern Afghanistan as a Tillyean bargaining process between the state and its armed competitors in the absence of strong, pre-existing formal institutions. Contrary to the ambitious aims of DDR and security sector reform, a political deal emerged in Balkh province that drew warlord-commander Atta Mohammed Noor into the state in order to prevent him and his subordinates from undermining it entirely from the outside. Governor Atta has since established a significant degree of surveillance and penetration as a function of managing loyalists who might otherwise pose a threat to the province’s stability. He has embraced formal institution-building to an extent but maintains a degree of informal power that ensures his dominance in the region and his influence vis-à-vis Kabul. While the result of this arrangement does not represent ‘good governance’ in Weberian terms, it has yielded certain dividends for the state and the international community, from security and reconstruction to counternarcotics, and may represent the best that can be expected under the challenging circumstances of post-2001 Afghanistan.” (P. 535).

**Naqvi, Saeed.** “Afghanistan Today & Tomorrow.” New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 2010. 8 p. [http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/orfdiscourse/attachments/od5\\_1286780608411.pdf](http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/orfdiscourse/attachments/od5_1286780608411.pdf) (750 KB). A summary of the contemporary situation in Afghanistan drawn from discussions with “political leaders, Taleban, US officials, filmmakers, journalists, NGOs, religious leaders and ordinary Afghans.” Some focus on the place of Pakistan in Afghan affairs.

“Piecemeal or Peace Deal?: NATO Peace Talks and a Political Settlement in Afghanistan: NATO Heads of Government Summit, Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010.” [London?]: Christian Aid, Open Society Foundation, Oxford Research Group, 2010. 10 p. <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/PiecemealOrPeaceDeal.pdf> (306 KB). “NATO leaders meet in Lisbon on 19-20 November for a summit overshadowed by the war in Afghanistan and just weeks ahead of President Obama’s crucial review of US strategy on the war expected in December. While there has been a flurry of recent reports about talks with the Taliban, underneath this surge of mood music hinting at a possible peace deal, a closer listening reveals little real change to the underlying drum beat on Afghanistan in NATO capitals. As three organisations working across the fields of development, conflict resolution, and good governance and human rights we have come together because we believe that the

international strategy on Afghanistan is at a critical point of both risk and opportunity, and must change. The Summit will be the last chance for NATO member states to consider a change of course on Afghanistan before next month’s US policy review. The Summit is expected to announce a timetable for the transition for Afghan security forces to take responsibility for the country’s security, province by province, from 2011 to 2014. But leaders should also be holding serious high-level discussions on what it would take to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement which would ensure a real transition from war to peace. Instead NATO governments seem more comfortable focusing their resources on a military-driven strategy, instead of a political settlement.” (P. 1).

**Rubin, Michael.** “Taking Tea with the Taliban: Declassified State Department Documents Tell a Sorry Tale of Diplomatic Engagement for its own Sake—and Offer a Cautionary Lesson for the Future.” *Commentary*, February 2010, p. 10-15. [http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewpdf.cfm?article\\_id=15344](http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewpdf.cfm?article_id=15344) (104 KB). An account of US diplomatic involvement with the Taliban in Afghanistan (particularly under the Clinton administration).

**Ruttig, Thomas.** “The Ex-Taleban on the High Peace Council.” [Berlin]: Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), 2010. 8 p. [http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/20101020TRuttig\\_ExT\\_in\\_HPC.pdf](http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/20101020TRuttig_ExT_in_HPC.pdf) (234 KB). This extremely useful paper “provides a first analysis of the former Taleban members on the newly-established Afghan High Peace Council (HPC), of what their possible role may be in this body, their political and historical background as well as the development of their positions vis-à-vis a possible process of negotiations. An analysis of the 70 High Peace Council members reveals that 53 of them formerly belonged or currently are linked to political groups that were armed factions involved in the civil wars of the 1980-90s. Twelve members held positions in the Taleban Emirate’s government between 1996 and 2001.” (Abstract).

**Torjesen, Stina and Tatjana Stankovic.** “Regional Change: how will the Rise of India and China shape Afghanistan’s stabilization process?” Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010. 48 p. ISBN 9788270022915. <http://english.nupi.no/content/download/33576/173199/version/7/file/NUPI+Report-Torjesen-Stankovic.pdf> (1.1 MB). “The report examines how regional developments in Central/South Asia may affect the prospects for stabilization in Afghanistan. Given that the regional security dynamics played an important role in aggravating the conflict in Afghanistan in the 1990s, the report juxtaposes the situation in the 1990s with the present state of affairs and aims to assess the potential regional impact. The findings indicate


that the region, still marked by inter-regional rivalry and security concerns, has nevertheless undergone substantial changes, most notably shaped by the rise of China and India, as well as by increasing regional cooperation in trade, transport and energy, which adds a nascent yet significant liberal element to regional affairs. As such, the regional environment seems less prone to exacerbate the internal security dynamics of Afghanistan than was the case in the 1990s. The report also maps regional alliances and rivalries, examines the ambiguous role of Iran and provides an overview of the relations between Afghanistan and Central Asian states.” (Abstract).

**Waldman, Matt.** “Dangerous Liaisons with the Afghan Taliban: the Feasibility and Risks of Negotiations.” Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 2010. 15 p. <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20256%20-%20Dangerous%20Liaisons%20with%20the%20Afghan%20Taliban.pdf> (244 KB). “This report is based on six months of field research between January and June 2010, funded by the U.S. Institute of Peace and Canadian Global Peace and Security Fund. The research involved separate, in-depth interviews with eighty individuals, mainly in Kabul and Kandahar, including fourteen insurgents, as well as former Taliban officials, diplomats, analysts, community and tribal leaders, and civil society representatives. It also involved forty interviews and ten focus groups with ordinary Afghans. To encourage frankness, and for safety reasons, most interviews were nonattributable. The aim was to better understand insurgent motivations and objectives, and in light of this, to assess the feasibility, risks, and implications of negotiations. The field research, which focused on the core Quetta Shura-led Taliban, faced constraints of access, verification, and insurgent differentiation. The findings should therefore be seen as a step toward understanding the movement, rather than anything more complete.” (P. 1).

## Public Opinion

“ABC News, BBC and ARD, Washington Post Poll [of Public Opinion in Afghanistan October 29-November 13, 2010]: Afghanistan: Where Things Stand: Afghan Views Worsen as Setbacks Counter US Progress in Helmand.” [New York?]: ABC News, 2010. 56 p.; 30 cm. <http://www.langerresearch.com/uploads/1116a1Afghanistan.pdf> (482 KB) “This survey was conducted for ABC News, the BBC, ARD and The Washington Post by the Afghan Center of Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) in Kabul, a subsidiary of D3 Systems Inc. of Vienna [Virginia]. Interviews were conducted in person, in Dari or Pashto, among a random national sample of 1,691 Afghan adults Oct. 29-Nov. 13, 2010.” (Website).

**Afghanistan in 2010: a survey of the Afghan people.** Kabul: The Asia Foundation, 2010. 225 p. <http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/797> (3.55 MB). First started in 2004, this annual survey interviewed 6,467 adult Afghans between June 18 and July 5, 2010. This year the survey has placed a greater emphasis on sub-national governance, the economy, development, women and society, and democratic values.



“Afghanistan Transition: Missing Variables: Field Research Helmand, Kandahar, Panjshir and Parwan Provinces, Afghanistan, October 2010.” Data analysis London, United Kingdom; lead field researcher Norine MacDonald; policy analysis Alexander Jackson, Primoz Manfreda; research fellows Marco Picardi, Armand Steinmeyer. London: The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), November 2010. 102 p. [http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/afghanistan\\_transition\\_missing\\_variables.pdf](http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/afghanistan_transition_missing_variables.pdf) (5.4 MB). Based on interviews with 1,500 men in Helmand, Kandahar, Panjshir and Parwan Provinces of Afghanistan this report summarises responses to questions about perceptions of NATO-ISAF forces, the wider international community, attitudes towards the Taliban, and opinions on international development efforts in their community.

**Gaston, Erica and Jonathan Horowitz.** “The Trust Deficit: the Impact of Local Perceptions on Policy in Afghanistan.” [Kabul?]: Open Society Foundations, October 7, 2010. 25 p. [http://www.soros.org/initiatives/mena/articles\\_publications/publications/policy-afghanistan-20101007/perceptions-20101007.pdf](http://www.soros.org/initiatives/mena/articles_publications/publications/policy-afghanistan-20101007/perceptions-20101007.pdf) (240 KB). “In late 2009 and 2010, the Open Society Foundations, in cooperation with local Afghan civil society organizations, including the Afghan Development Association, the Community Health Association, The Liaison Office, and the Welfare Association for the Development of Afghanistan, conducted research to understand Afghan perceptions about warring parties to the conflict. Over 250 Afghans participated in focus groups or individual interviews across Kabul and in six provinces: Herat, Khandahar, Khost, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Wardak. Participants were primarily male, although women from Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Herat were also interviewed. In addition to this research, the authors consulted with independent human rights monitors, researchers, and community representatives

who have examined similar issues in other parts of the country, for example, in Kunduz, Logar, and Uruzgan provinces.” (p. 5-6). Summary in Dari: [http://www.soros.org/initiatives/mena/articles\\_publications/publications/policy-afghanistan-20101007/trust-deficit-dari-20101007.pdf](http://www.soros.org/initiatives/mena/articles_publications/publications/policy-afghanistan-20101007/trust-deficit-dari-20101007.pdf) (100 KB).

## Refugees

Macdonald, Ingrid. “Afghanistan’s Reintegration Challenges: Land and Housing.” Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, May 2010. 3 p. <http://www.peacebuilding.no/eng/Publications/Articles/Afghanistan-s-reintegration-challenges-land-and-housing-PDF> (210 KB). “Afghanistan’s decades of conflict have forced millions of its people - a third of the population - from their homes, their land and their country. Today, many face major problems reintegrating back into society, which are made even worse by escalating conflict and insecurity since the mid-2000s. Two key problems are the lack of access to land and adequate housing, without which many returning refugees and internally displaced people have been forced to live in poor, overcrowded and makeshift conditions. The flaws of Afghanistan’s legal systems (both formal and informal), and of the government’s land allocation scheme, mean that progress in delivering results on the scale needed has been limited. This neglected issue, which a few aid agencies such as the UNHCR and the Norwegian Refugee Council are tackling, requires greater attention and support from the international community.” (P. 1).

Majidiyar, Ahmad and Ali Alfoneh. “Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Refugees as Political Instruments.” Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, November 2010. 5 p. <http://www.aei.org/docLib/2010-11-MEO-g.pdf> (164 KB). There are as many as 2.5 million Afghans currently resident in Iran. This paper draws conclusions about how they may figure in Iran’s relationship with Afghanistan and by implication the United States.

## Remittances

Parto, Saeed and Ahmad Shaheer Anil. “Remittance Corridor Between the Netherlands and Afghanistan: an Overview.” Kabul: Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO), May 2010. 14 p. <http://appro.org.af/downloads/Remittances.pdf> (401 KB). “Recognizing the importance of remittances in general and to gain more in-depth understanding of this mostly traditional and poorly understood sub-sector, the World Bank has been commissioning a series of studies with the following objectives: 1. Gain new knowledge to better understand the size and nature of remittance flows; 2. Identify incentives

that influence remittance senders and recipients to use the available mechanisms; 3. Devise policies to regulate the activities of the emerging new players such as money transfer operators; 4. Address the implications of compliance with standards on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing; 5. Identify opportunities for introduction of financial products in the mostly heterogeneous remittance markets. Consistent with the above, the results of this study are intended for use by the Dutch Government to raise awareness among banks and financial institutions offering remittance services (e.g., Western Union and MoneyGram) of the relative importance of the Dutch-Afghan remittance corridor. By stimulating the interest of the financial sector, the Dutch Government hopes to promote greater use of formal channels for transferring money to Afghanistan. This would reduce the risk of appropriating the funds for illicit activities such as the drugs trade or terrorism and make possible the linking of the remittances sub-sector to development aid, policymaking and innovation in product and service provision such as loans and mortgages, savings accounts, and microcredit by modern financial sector operators.” (P. 1).



## Roads

Heydari, Nicole and Benoît Paré. “Road Compensation in Nijrab District, Kapisa Province: Final Report.” [Nijrab, Kapisa]: TF La Fayette, 2010. 16 p. PDF (1.0 MB). Description of a compensation scheme set up to recompense landowners for land taken over for Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) road-building projects in Nijrab District, Kapisa.

## Security

Abbas, Hassan. “Militancy in Pakistan’s Borderlands: Implications for the Nation and for Afghan Policy.” New York: Century Foundation, 2010. 40 p. <http://tcf.org/publications/2010/10/militancy-in-pakistan2019s-borderlands-implications-for-the-nation-and-for-afghan-policy/pdf> (1.1 MB). An outline of the history of security and political conditions in the area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan (since early-2010 known as Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province (KPP) formerly the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)). The summary of the various recent peace deals and truces is a useful compilation.



Anand Gopal. "The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar." Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, November 2010. 30 p. [http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/111010gopal\\_kandahar.pdf](http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/111010gopal_kandahar.pdf) (3.7 MB). "As Afghanistan's cultural and political heartland, Kandahar is a province of key strategic importance for foreign forces, the Afghan government, and the insurgency. A sizable chunk of the Taliban's senior leadership hails from the province, and the cultural and political dynamics of rural Kandahar shape aspects of the movement's character to this day. This study attempts to understand the Taliban of Kandahar by looking at the factors that spurred their rise and the networks and structures through which they operate." (Executive Summary).


Bijlert, Martine Van. "The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan." Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, 23 September 2010. 23 p. [http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/zabuluruzgan\\_0.pdf](http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/zabuluruzgan_0.pdf) (1.4 MB). "This paper aims to explore in more detail the roots and resurgence of the Taliban in Zabul and Uruzgan, in an effort to tease out some of the recurring themes. The first section of the paper discusses the area's main loyalties and fault lines, as well as the evolution of the Taliban movement in the two provinces, from the anti-Soviet resistance to the establishment and fall of the Islamic Emirate. The second section focuses on factors that facilitated the revival of the movement as a potent insurgency. The third section discusses the current nature and structure of the movement in Zabul and Uruzgan. Finally, the fourth section discusses the impact of the international military operations on the situation in the provinces." (P. 3).

Cordesman, Anthony H., Adam Mausner, Jason Lemieux. "Afghan National Security Forces: What it will Take to Implement the ISAF Strategy." Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), November 2010. 229 p. ISBN 9780892066087. [http://csis.org/files/publication/101115\\_Cordesman\\_AfghanNationalSecurityForces\\_Web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/101115_Cordesman_AfghanNationalSecurityForces_Web.pdf) (6.0 MB). "President Obama's new strategy for Afghanistan is critically dependent upon the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). His speech announcing this strategy called for the transfer to begin in mid-2011. However, creating the Afghan forces needed to bring about security and stability is a far more difficult problem than many realize, and poses major challenges that will endure long after 2011. A successful effort to create effective Afghan forces, particularly forces that can largely replace the role of US and allied forces, must overcome a legacy of more than eight

years of critical failures in both force development and training, and in the broader course of the US effort in Afghanistan. Such an effort must also be shaped as part of an integrated civil-military effort, and not treated simply as an exercise in generating more Afghan military and police forces. Success will be equally dependent on strategic patience. There is a significant probability that the ANSF will not be ready for any major transfer of responsibility until well after 2011. Trying to expand Afghan forces too quickly, creating forces with inadequate force quality, and decoupling Afghan force development from efforts to deal with the broad weaknesses in Afghan governance and the Afghan justice system, will lose the war. America's politicians, policymakers, and military leaders must accept this reality—and persuade the Afghan government and our allies to act accordingly—or the mission in Afghanistan cannot succeed." (Executive Summary).

Curtis, Lisa. "Taliban Reconciliation: Obama Administration must be Clear and Firm." Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 11 March, 2010. 6 p. [http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf\\_media/2010/pdf/bg2384.pdf](http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2010/pdf/bg2384.pdf) (353 KB). "As 30,000 additional American soldiers are deployed to Afghanistan, the U.S. is also focusing on reintegrating Taliban insurgents into Afghan society. There has been speculation that this new focus is part of a quick-exit strategy for the U.S. While reintegrating as many local Taliban fighters as possible is a vital part of the counterinsurgency strategy, premature negotiations with Taliban leaders based in Pakistan could easily backfire. The Obama Administration must bear in mind that insurgents are more likely to negotiate if they fear defeat on the battlefield. The Taliban have steadily regained influence in Afghanistan over the last four years—and U.S. and NATO forces must first weaken the Taliban on the battlefield before engaging in serious negotiations with the leadership." (Abstract).

"Dismantling the 'Taliban' One Non-Taliban Group at a Time: Rethinking CF's Over Usage of the Term Taliban." Kabul, Afghanistan: Human Terrain System (HTS)-Afghanistan, ISAF Headquarters, [2010]. 12 p. PDF (250 KB). "For the past 9 years the US, its allies and the Western media have consistently referred to all the insurgents, including non-political criminals, in Afghanistan as Taliban even though



the conflict involves many different players and groups. CF (Coalition Forces) leaders, from cabinet members back in D.C. to military commanders in the field, continue to indiscriminately apply the term Taliban as a blanket term for all insurgents. Further exacerbating the problem, Western leaders have recently decided to divide the insurgents into two basic camps, 'extreme' Taliban and 'moderate' Taliban. This is a very simplistic categorization of the insurgents, not to mention extremely inaccurate. There are major insurgent groups NOT under the Taliban banner, not to mention various divisions within the Taliban themselves. If we are to defeat the insurgents, we must first understand who they are and where their allegiances lie. As long as CF continue to treat the plethora of insurgent groups as a unified movement called The Taliban, success will be very difficult to achieve. Taking advantage of the differences, existing conflicts and contradictions between the various insurgent groups and commanders both on ideological and personal levels could allow CF to divide, dismantle and significantly weaken the opposition. Although the pen is considered mightier than the sword in the West, it is important to understand that in Afghanistan the tongue is mightier than either the pen or the sword." (P. 1).


**Dorransoro, Gilles.** "Afghanistan at the Breaking Point." Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010. 49 p. [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan\\_break\\_point.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_break_point.pdf) (1.6 MB). "The current strategy of defeating the Taliban militarily is unrealistic. The coalition is on the defensive across much of Afghanistan and, with current troop levels, can at most only contain the insurgency. On present course, the coalition is swiftly heading toward an impasse. Just to retain the areas currently controlled by the coalition would require significant additional troops next year. Many more than that would be required for the coalition, with heavy losses, to adopt an offensive stance and win back territory. Such an escalation, though, is politically untenable given the impending departure of European forces and dwindling public support for the war. A new strategy is required. Rather than committing more troops, the United States should instead pursue a political solution to the conflict, including a ceasefire and negotiations with the insurgents. By insisting on powersharing among the various Afghan factions and reserving the right to intervene militarily to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a sanctuary for extremist groups, the United States can still accomplish the more limited objective of preventing the return of al-Qaeda. However, the United States must act quickly. Given the rapidly deteriorating security situation, every passing month strengthens the position of the Taliban. A viable exit strategy is still possible, but time is not on America's side." (P. 5).

**"The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006-2010: a TLO Socio-political Assessment."** Kabul: The Liaison Office, August 2010. 73 p. <http://www.tlo-afghanistan.org/sites/default/files/The%20Dutch%20engagement%20in%20Uruzgan%20%E2%80%93%20TLO%20Report%202010%20WEB.pdf> (1.0 MB). "On 1 August 2010, a four-year Dutch civil-military engagement in Uruzgan came to an end. The Dutch comprehensive '3D' approach emphasized development, diplomacy/governance, and defense/security, and sought to diplomatically use development where possible and to employ force only as necessary. This TLO report assesses the impact of the Dutch approach, supported by Australian and U.S. forces, on the political, economic and security situation in Uruzgan. The withdrawal of their 1,600 troops raises the question of whether momentum in Uruzgan has been cut short and whether the changes the Dutch introduced will prove to be durable. The continuity of successful momentum in Uruzgan depends on how their successors (Australia and the U.S.) build upon past work and follow-on the Dutch approach. Using a 2006 TLO assessment conducted at the beginning of the Dutch civil-military mission in Uruzgan as a baseline, this report evaluates the changes that have occurred in Uruzgan over the past four years. It covers the areas of: (1) Socio-economic development and reconstruction including agro-economic development, health care, education, media/communication and gender equality; (2) Governance and the rule of law including provincial and district level government, elections, Afghan National Security Forces (ANA/ANP), and the justice sector; (3) (In)security and the insurgency including assessment of district level security and government control, road security and an overview of regional dimensions and conflict lines exploited by the insurgency; (4) International military actors and the Dutch withdrawal including perception of International Military Forces (Dutch, U.S. and Australians) and the local evaluation of Dutch withdrawal; (5) Recommendations for Dutch successors in the areas of development/reconstruction, diplomacy/political engagement, and stabilization/security. This report is based upon four years of continuous research in the province including a 2009 assessment and 64 interviews conducted between 1 June and July 2010." (Website).

**Ess, Brett van.** "The Fight for Marjah: Recent Counterinsurgency Operations in Southern Afghanistan." 2010. 36 p. *Small Wars Journal*, 30 September 2010. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/563-vaness.pdf> (332 KB). "In early 2010...the International Security Assistance Force and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan began implementing a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign. This strategy stands in contrast to the counternarcotics and counterterrorism

focus in Marjah from 2001 to late 2009. Initial elements of this new campaign plan were implemented in February 2010 when Operation Moshtarak began in Marjah. This paper details the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Marjah over the last year.” (P. 1).

**“The Human Terrain of Shah Joy District, Zabul Province, Afghanistan, September 2010: Village Perceptions Concerning Security, Governance, Development and the Economy.”** [S.I.]: AF8 Human Terrain Team, 2010. 60 p. PDF (3.6 MB). “In September 2010, Human Terrain Team AF8, conducted a human terrain study of villages along Highway 1 that were within 10 km (the effective radius of GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] influence of the Shah Joy District Center, Zabul Province. The purpose of this study was to assist 2SCR and the Romanian 812<sup>th</sup> Battalion Task Force Hawks better understand local dynamics in relation to GIRoA and increased ISAF presence. In addition, this study has identified areas in which Combined Team Zabul could effectively apply resources to assist the population and its government.” (P. 4). Includes details on education, 2010 elections, agriculture, household numbers, etc.



Jackson, Ashley. “Nowhere to Turn: the Failure to Protect Civilians in Afghanistan: a Joint Briefing Paper by 29 Aid Organizations working in Afghanistan for the NATO Heads of Government Summit, Lisbon, November 19-20, 2010.” [Kabul, Afghanistan]: Oxfam International, November 2010. 24 p. <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/OXFAM-Nowhere-to-Turn-Failure-to-Protect-Civilians-Afghanistan.pdf> (1.54 MB). “Security for the vast majority of Afghans is rapidly deteriorating. As 29 aid organizations working in Afghanistan, we are deeply concerned about the impact of the escalating conflict on civilians. It is likely that increased violence in 2011 will lead to more civilian casualties, continue to fuel displacement, cut off access to basic services and reduce the ability of aid agencies to reach those who need assistance most. This paper does not attempt to address all



aspects of the current conflict. It concentrates on those that negatively impact civilians, particularly in the context of transition to Afghan responsibility for security. While this paper primarily focuses on the actions and strategy of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), it is important to remember that armed opposition groups (AOG), who are stronger and control more territory than at any time since 2001, also have clear obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL) to protect civilians. As such, this paper will make reference to AOG actions and issue recommendations to AOG where applicable.” (Introduction)

**“Life and Perceptions in Villages along Highway 1 North of Qalat, Zabul, Afghanistan.”** [Qalat?, Zabul]: Human Terrain Team AF8, August 2010. 36 p. PDF (2 MB). “This document describes the perceptions of villagers along Highway 1 north of Qalat [capital of Zabul Province], roughly in the area running 3 kilometers to 35 kilometers north of Qalat City. It examines the area with regard to security, economics, development,

leaders and tribes. It also outlines possible courses of action that can be taken by Coalition Forces (CF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to improve security, the economy and people’s satisfaction with their government amongst the population in the area. It also lists some key leaders in the villages, generally with pictures included.” (P. 2)

**“Lost in the Wilderness: HTT, AF01 Trip Report 12-20 October 2010, Gerda Serai District.”** Khost, [Khost Province]: Human Terrain Team AF01, 2010. 12 p. PDF (476 KB). Brief reports of interviews (October 2010) with residents of Gerda Serai in Paktiya about security, governance, elections, reconciliation, the economy and development.

MacKenzie, Jean. “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Helmand.” Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, September 2010. 20 p. <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/helmand2.pdf> (1.1 MB). Useful overview and background on military history in Helmand, with a review of the situation under the Taliban before 2001 and up to now.

Meyerle, Jerry, Megan Katt and Jim Gavrillis. *Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: how Different Units adapted to Local Conditions.* Alexandria, Virginia: CNA Analysis & Solutions,

November, 2010. viii, 171 p. <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Counterinsurgency%20on%20the%20Ground%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf> (6.3 MB). “This book provides a glimpse into what relatively small military units—teams, platoons, companies, and highly dispersed battalions—have done [against] the insurgency in some of the more remote areas of Afghanistan. The book includes 15 vignettes about different units from the US Marines, Army, and Special Forces, the British Army and Marines, the Dutch Army and Marines, and the Canadian Army. The case studies cover ten provinces in Afghanistan’s south and east. They describe the diverse conditions these units faced, how they responded to these conditions, what worked and what did not, and the successes they achieved.” (Back Cover).

Noer, John N. “Tactical Operations in Support of Afghan Reconciliation & Reintegration: Concepts for Locally-focused Afghan Reintegration Operations.” Khost, Afghanistan: Human Terrain Team AF01, August 2010. v, 30 p. PDF (573 KB). “As hope of reconciliation with Taliban leadership wanes, the emphasis has turned to reconciliation of insurgent fighters during conflict. The Kabul government promotes peace by absorbing insurgents, and ISAF has established a funding mechanism. There is no guidance yet on what tactical operations to undertake to make the initiative work on the ground. This document identifies numerous decision factors and sketches a conceptual vision.” (Executive Summary).

*PRT Interagency Lessons Learned Project.* [Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.]: Center for Complex Operations (CCO), October 2010. 144 p. PDF (1.7 MB). “The Center for Complex Operations (CCO), in conjunction with the interagency Best Practices Working Group (BPWG), has been coordinating a project to gather lessons and best practices from civilian and military members serving on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. The CCO partners with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to conduct interviews of recently returned civilian PRT members, collaborates with the Services as they interview military members of the PRTs, gathers interviews of civilian and military personnel from other sources, and conducts field trips to collect information from currently deployed PRT personnel. In addition, CCO administers written surveys to military and civilian PRT members. The interview and survey questions are standardized for both military and civilian PRT members. This memorandum summarizes the main observations derived from interviews conducted between fall 2009 and summer 2010 and presents issues for consideration to be reviewed by the BPWG, the agencies, and the Services. The issues for consideration are derived from PRT personnel feedback; they have not been subject to a full analysis and are not policy recommendations.” (P. 6).

“Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan [1 April to 30 September 2010].” Washington, D.C.: [US Dept. of Defense], November 2010. 105 p. [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November\\_1230\\_Report\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf) (3.23 MB). This report summarizes US Department of Defense views on progress and challenges in Afghanistan under the headings of Strategy, Afghan National Security Forces, Security, Governance, Reconstruction and Development, Counternarcotics, and Regional Engagement.

“Sangin Population: Final Analysis Report.” [Delaram, Nimroz]: Human Terrain Team (HTT) AF06, Regimental Combat Team-2, 16 November 2010. 45 p. PDF (1.2 MB). “On 07 October 2010, eight members of Human Terrain Team (HTT) AF06 traveled to the Sangin District of Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in support of the Regimental Combat Team-2 (RCT-2) mission of securing and stabilizing the Sangin District. Operationally, AF06 collaborated with 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) to analyze key features of the Sangin population and resolve the following information gaps: current tribal dynamics, identification of influential actors, and identification of influential persons associated with key infrastructure and resources. AF06 conducted this population analysis by interviewing 86 locals over a three and a half week period.” (P. 2).

Schetter, Conrad and Rainer Glassner. “Neither Functioning, nor Failing of the State! Seeing Violence in Afghanistan from Local Perspectives.” In *From Fragile State to Functioning State: Pathways to Democratic Transformation in Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, and Afghanistan*, edited by Savine Collmer. Berlin: LIT/Transaction Press, 2009, p. 137-156. <http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/bib/DOKUMENTE/06.staat-politik/schetter-glassner-2009b.pdf> (122 KB). “‘Warlordism’ and its connoted perceptions in our view are not sufficient enough to characterize the structures of violence in Afghanistan. While we do not deny the existence of warlords in Afghanistan, the manifold forms of individual leadership as well as the local differences regarding security arrangements are too significant for them to be positioned on a linear axis between warlords on the one side and the modern state on the other. To support our argument, we will discuss the balance of power and influence between the center and the periphery in Afghanistan. Based on this analysis we will reveal the security situation on a provincial level in three case studies—Kunduz, Kandahar and Paktia. Hereby, we intend to demonstrate that the variety of security arrangements on the local level is enormous.” (P. 138)

Zimmerman, S. Rebecca [et al.]. “If you’ve seen one VSP, you’ve seen one VSP: Understanding

**Best Practices in Village Stability Operations.”** [Kabul]: Commander’s Initiatives Group, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), September 2010. 31 p. “Drawing upon field research and interviews with several teams conducting Village Stability Operations (VSO), this paper...highlights fourteen of the most common problems and decision-points of Special Forces (SF) Operational Detachments Alpha (ODAs), Marine Special Operations Teams (MSOTs), and Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) Platoons conducting remote counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan through VSO. For each of these it presents several teams’ approaches to the problem, highlighting the range of ‘right answers,’ the logical processes underlying those answers and the salient factors considered by the teams.” (Executive Summary).

## Transport



**“Sherkhan Bandar to Herat Railway Line: Pre-feasibility Study: Phase II Final Report, Volume 1 Pre-feasibility Report.”** Dhaka, Bangladesh: HB Consultants, May 2010. 57 p. PDF (4.5 MB). A “pre-feasibility” study for the construction of a railway line from Sherkhan Bandar (on Afghanistan’s border with Tajikistan) through Kunduz and Mazar

to Herat, with connections from Aqina and Torghundi on the Afghan-Turkmenistan border). In total around 1,000 kilometres of track costing an estimated US \$7 billion. This proposed line would link to the newly opened link from the Uzbek border (Hairatan) to Mazar.

## Women

**Cortright, David and Sarah Smiles Persinger. “Afghan Women Speak: Enhancing Security and Human Rights in Afghanistan.”** Notre Dame, Indiana: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, October 2010. 34 p. <http://www.nd.edu/~jfallon2/WomenAfghanistanReport.pdf> (710 KB). “This report supports the negotiation of a political solution with insurgent groups and gradual demilitarization to help stabilize the region and reduce armed violence. However, the process should be gradual and linked to parallel diplomatic efforts and alternative security arrangements. Demilitarization should be coupled with the deployment of an interim protection force under the auspices of the United


Nations to provide transitional security protection for civilians. To guard against a roll back in women’s gains, the meaningful representation of women in all peace negotiations and post-conflict recovery planning is critical. As recognized in UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1889, women have a vital role to play in building and preserving peace. They must be fully represented in deliberations over Afghanistan’s future. International donors must use their leverage with the Afghan government to ensure women’s inclusion in high-level peace negotiation and reintegration bodies, making funding for reintegration programs conditional on women’s participation.” (P. 2).

**“Family Law Reform and Women’s Rights in Muslim Countries: Perspectives and Lessons Learned.”** Seminar Report. Montreal: Rights & Democracy, June 2010. 57 p. <http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/RightsDemocracy.Family-Law-Seminar-Report.pdf> (552 KB). The third international conference on family law was held in Kabul in 2010, this publication summarizes the presentations and discussions that took place. Topics covered include reforming family laws (including comparison with progress in Morocco), the process of divorce, as well as presentations about alimony, child custody, polygamy and consent to marriage.

**“From Resolution to Reality: Lessons Learned from Afghanistan, Nepal and Uganda on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Governance.”** [London?]: CARE International, 2010. 43 p. <http://www.care-international.org/View-document/568-From-Resolution-to-Reality-Lessons-learned-from-Afghanistan-Nepal-and-Uganda.html?format=raw&tmpl=component> PDF (7.93 KB). “UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325, 2000) was hailed a victory for women’s rights activists around the world. The adoption of the resolution represented a significant step forward in recognising the strategic contribution that women can make to peace and security policy, as well as acknowledging the increasing use of violence against women as a tactic of war. Yet a decade later, women are still largely absent from peace negotiations. How can the policy be turned into practice, which impacts on the lives of women most affected by conflict? Ten years on from the initial adoption of SCR 1325, CARE International launched this study to reflect on our own operational experience, and the perspectives of our local partners in civil society and the communities with which we work...The research is driven by familiar questions including: ‘what does meaningful participation look like from the perspective of women in communities caught up in conflict? What can aid agency, UN and national government staff tell us about the realities of turning the policy commitments into practice? How can

different actors ensure more effective strategies to enable women’s meaningful participation in peace processes? How could the next ten years of SCR 1325 implementation better deliver on the aspirations the resolution embodies? Our survey in Afghanistan, Uganda and Nepal found that many thousands of women have used SCR 1325 to mobilise political action and resources in support of their rights and participation in peace and security policy. Yet despite all these efforts, women remain largely absent from the negotiating table.” (P. 1).

**“Harmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan.”** Kabul, Afghanistan: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 9 December 2010. 2, vii, 63 p. This report “documents particular customary practices that violate the rights of women and girls throughout Afghanistan, describes the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s response to these practices



and makes recommendations to end such practices.” (Executive Summary, P. i).

**“Know your Rights and Duties: the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women.”** [Kabul]: International Development Law Organization (IDLO), 2010. 15 p. <http://www.idlo.int/Publications/EVAW%20ENGLISH.pdf> (466 KB). “This booklet explains the following topics: violence against women is against the law; What are the punishments for crimes against women?; What are crimes of violence against women? (physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional and psychological abuse, crimes related to marriage, deprivation of property & inheritance, denial of access to education, work and healthcare); What are the rights of a victim of violence against women?; Who and where can one complain about a crime of violence against women?” (Back Cover). Also published in Dari :

حقوق و وځايې خوښه آگاه شويد : قانون منع خښونت عليه زن  
 د خپلو حقوقو او وځاييو څخه خبر اوسئ : د ښځو په وړاندې د تاوتریخوالي د مخنيوي قانون

## New Laws Received

Official gazette no.	Afghan date	International date	Title of law, regulation, etc.
1016	1389 Hamal 10	2010 March 30	Regulation on Arrangement of Pension Rights of Officers, <i>Bridmalan</i> and <i>Satanmanan</i> .
1020	1389 Saur 20	2010 May 10	Military Criminal Procedure Code
1020	1389 Saur 20	2010 May 10	Amendment of Paragraph 1 of Article 30 of the Cooperatives Law
1020	1389 Saur 20	2010 May 10	Omission [i.e. Deletion] and Amendment of Regulation on Establishment of Private Aviation Companies
1020	1389 Saur 20	2010 May 10	Re-amendment of Article 48 of Regulation on Fuel Expenses of Vehicles and Machines
1025	1389 Jauza 24	2010 June 14	Law against Intoxicating Drinks and Drugs as well as Controlling them
1026	1389 Jauza 25	2010 June 15	Regulation on Establishment and Registration of Political Parties
1026	1389 Jauza 25	2010 June 15	Amendments to Paragraph 2 of Article 19 of Regulation on Land Vehicle Registration
1026	1389 Jauza 25	2010 June 15	Annex 2 of Regulation of General Department of Geodesy and Cartography
1030	1389 Saratan 23	2010 July 14	Omission, Addition and Amendment of some Articles of [the] Electoral Law
1030	1389 Saratan 23	2010 July 14	Regulation of Private Educational Institutes
1030	1389 Saratan 23	2010 July 14	Regulation of Vaccines and Immunity Products
1033	1389 Asad 4	2010 July 26	Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Special Courts

Many law translations (all unofficial) are available at: <http://www.asianlii.org/af/legis/laws/>

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- Dec 2010 Understanding and Addressing Context in Rural Afghanistan: How Villages Differ and Why, by Adam Pain and Paula Kantor
- Dec 2010 Securing Life and Livelihoods in Rural Afghanistan: The Role of Social Relationships, by Paula Kantor and Adam Pain
- Dec 2010 Podcast: Community Based Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan, by Deborah J. Smith
- Dec 2010 Podcast: The Future of Democratisation in Afghanistan, by Anna Larson
- Nov 2010 Poverty in Afghan Policy: Enhancing Solutions through Better Defining the Problem, by Paula Kantor and Adam Pain
- Nov 2010 Governance Structures in Nimroz Province, by Anna Larson
- Nov 2010 #Means to What End? Policymaking and Statebuilding in Afghanistan, by Sarah Parkinson
- Oct 2010 #Afghanistan Research Newsletter 27
- Oct 2010 Community-Based Dispute Resolution Processes in Balkh Province, by Rebecca Gang
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- Sept 2010 The Impact of Microfinance Programmes on Women's Lives: A Case Study in Parwan Province, by Sogol Zand
- Sept 2010 Afghanistan Livelihood Trajectories: Evidence from Faryab, by Batul Nezami with Paula Kantor
- Sept 2010 Local Politics in Afghanistan: Elections and Instability II, by Noah Coburn
- Sept 2010 #The Wolesi Jirga in Flux, 2010: Elections and Instability I, by Anna Larson
- Sept 2010 #Afghan Election, 2010: Alternative Narratives, by Noah Coburn
- July 2010 Is Capacity Being Built? A Study of Policymaking Process in the Primary and Secondary Education Subsector, by Sayed Muhammad Shah
- July 2010 #Afghanistan Research Newsletter 26
- June 2010 #The Wolesi Jirga in 2010: Pre-election Politics and the Appearance of Opposition, by M. Hassan Wafaey with Anna Larson
- June 2010 #Corrupting the State or State-Crafted Corruption? Exploring the Nexus between Corruption and Subnational Governance, by Manija Gardizi, Karen Hussman and Yama Torabi
- May 2010 Afghanistan Livelihood Trajectories: Evidence from Sar-i-Pul, by Tom Shaw

# Indicates that the publication or a summary is or will be available in Dari and/or Pashto.